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JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT 
The Utah Supreme Court has original jurisdiction over attorney discipline pursuant 
to Article VIII, Section 4 of the Utah Constitution. See Utah Const, art. VIII, § 4 ("The 
Supreme Court by rule shall govern the practice of law, including admission to practice 
law and the conduct and discipline of persons admitted to practice law."). Direct appeal 
of an informal order of the Ethics and Discipline Committee is provided by Supreme 
Court Rule of Professional Practice 14-510(f) (effective November 1, 2009). In the event 
Rule 14-510(f) is deemed inapplicable to this matter, review is sought as a Petition for 
Extraordinary Relief under Rule 65B of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure and Rule 19 of 
the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure where "no other plain, speedy or adequate remedy 
is available."1 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES, STANDARD OF REVIEW, 
AND SUPPORTING AUTHORITY 
Petitioner Larry N. Long asserts the following issues on appeal: 
I. The Ethics and Discipline Committee Failed to Articulate Findings of Fact 
Which Would Justify Its Conclusions of Law. 
A. Standard of Review: 
1
 On November 1, 2009, Rule of Professional Practice 14-510 was amended to provide 
for direct appeal to the Utah Supreme Court from informal proceedings before the Ethics 
and Discipline Committee. The Order of Discipline in each matter below was issued 
after the effective date of the amended Rule. However, proceedings were conducted 
prior to the effective date of the amended Rule. As set forth in Long's Motion to Clarify 
Procedure for Review, deferred for plenary consideration, it is unclear whether the new 
direct appeal procedure is to apply to matters pending, or only to matters originating after 
the effective date of the amendment. Long asserts that Rule 14-510, as amended, applies 
to this matter. 
675 :425618vl 
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"Judicial discipline and lawyer discipline in particular, are essentially original 
proceedings here. In the case of lawyer discipline, the authority to discipline lawyers 
rests entirely with this court and is delegated by our rules to the Utah State Bar for some 
functions, and to the district courts for others. . . . In both cases, they act under our 
original authority, and matters eventually brought to us for action come not as appeals, 
but by way of final confirmation or rejection of actions taken by our delegees." In re 
Anderson, 2004 UT 7, Tf 46, 82 P.3d 1334 (internal citations omitted). 
B. Preservation: 
Long preserved this issue by filing an Exception to the recommendation of 
discipline in each case, in accordance with Rule of Professional Practice 14-510(c). See 
Exceptions to Screening Panel's Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law, and 
Recommendations for Public Reprimand, Case No. 07-0497 (hereinafter "Shepard 
Exceptions Brief), p.7-9; Exceptions to Screening Panel's Findings of Fact, Conclusions 
of Law, and Recommendations for Public Reprimand, Case No. 08-0049 (hereinafter 
"Nelson Exceptions Brief), p.7-9; Exceptions to Screening Panel's Findings of Fact, 
Conclusions of Law, and Recommendations for Public Reprimand, Case No. 08-0080 
(hereinafter "Henroid2 Exceptions Brief), p.7-11.3 
2
 Because Judge Henroid did not to submit a verified, notarized complaint, Judge Henroid 
is not considered the complainant in OPC File No. 08-0080. Rather, the OPC is the 
official complainant. However, because Judge Henroid's letter prompted the OPC's 
investigation and is the origin of this matter, we refer to OPC File No. 08-0080 as the 
"Henroid matter" for clarity. 
&-7* -A-)C:K.'\Q\/I 
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II. The Screening Panel's Recommendation Was Not Based Upon Substantial 
Evidence. 
A. Standard of Review: 
"In reviewing cases involving attorney discipline, we 'review the trial court's 
findings of fact under the clearly erroneous standard/ but 'reserve the right to draw 
different inferences from the facts than those drawn by the trial court.'" In re Discipline 
of Crawley, 2007 UT 44, \ 17, 164 P.3d 1232 (quoting In re Discipline oflnce, 957 P.2d 
1233, 1236 (Utah 1998)); see also In re Discipline ofSchwenke, 849 P.2d 573, 576 (Utah 
1993) (stating that factual findings are sustained so long as they are supported by 
substantial evidence). 
B. Preservation: 
Long preserved this issue by filing an Exception to the recommendation of 
discipline in each case, in accordance with Rule of Professional Practice 14-510(c). See 
Shepard Exceptions Brief, p.4-7; Nelson Exceptions Brief, p.4-6; Henroid Exceptions 
Brief, p 4-7. 
III. The Screening Panel Misinterpreted the Rules of Professional Conduct 
Erroneously Finding Violations of Rules 1.5 (a), 3.1, 5.3(a), 5.5(a), and 8.4(a). 
A. Standard of Review: 
A court's interpretation of the rules of professional conduct is reviewed for 
correctness. In re Discipline of Sonnenreich, 2004 UT 3, ^ f 12, 86 P. 3d 712; Nemelka v. 
The record filed with the court was not consecutively paginated across all three OPC 
matters. Per discussions with the clerk of the court and by agreement of counsel, 
documents which may be found in the record compiled by the Screening Panel will be 
identified by OPC matter using the numbering system of the Screening Panel's record 
(i.e. "Shepard R. 000187"). Documents which postdate the Screening Panel's record will 
be identified by OPC matter and document name (i.e. "Nelson Exceptions Brief, p. 3"). 
675 :425618vl 
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Ethics & Discipline Comm. of the Utah Supreme Court, 2009 UT 33, | 9, 210 P.3d 525 
("We therefore afford no deference to a panel chair's interpretation of our rules."). 
B. Preservation: 
Long preserved this issue by filing an Exception to the recommendation of 
discipline in each case, in accordance with Rule of Professional Practice 14-510(c). See 
Shepard Exceptions Brief, p.9-13; Nelson Exceptions Brief, p.9-21; Henroid Exceptions 
Brief, p.l 1-13. 
IV. The Screening Panel's Disciplinary Recommendations, Including 
Recommended Discipline for Violating Rules 7.1 and 7.5(d), Are Improper 
and Inconsistent. 
A. Standard of Review: 
In re Doncouse, 2004 UT 77, 1 10, 99 P.3d 837 ("It is our duty to make an 
independent determination as to the appropriate sanction to be imposed."); In re 
Discipline of Harding, 2004 UT 100, ^ 12, 104 P.3d 1220 ("In determining an 
appropriate sanction, this court is free to examine all relevant facts and circumstances and 
is under no obligation to defer to the conclusions of any other body."). 
B. Preservation: 
Long preserved this issue by filing an Exception to the recommendation of 
discipline in each case, in accordance with Rule of Professional Practice 14-510(c). See 
Shepard Exceptions Brief, p. 12-15; Nelson Exceptions Brief, p. 12-13; Henroid 
Exceptions Brief, p. 13-15. 
A"7C - / n C C I Q w l 
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DETERMINATIVE LAW 
The following rules are fully set forth in the Addendum to Brief of Petitioner, 
submitted herewith: 
Rule of Professional Practice 14-510(b)(7) (formerly 14-510(b)(5). 
Rule of Professional Practice 14-510(f)(5). 
Rule of Professional Practice 14-602(d). 
Rule of Professional Practice 14-605(d). 
Rule of Professional Conduct 1.5(a). 
Rule of Professional Conduct 3.1. 
Rule of Professional Conduct 5.3(a). 
Rule of Professional Conduct 5.5(a). 
Rule of Professional Conduct 7.1. 
Rule of Professional Conduct 7.5(d). 
Rule of Professional Conduct 8.4(a). 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
A. Nature of the Case 
This petition seeks review of and relief from an Order of Discipline: Admonition 
(OPC File No. 07-0497—Shepard) and an Order of Discipline: Public Reprimand (OPC 
File No. 08-0049—Nelson) issued by Respondent Ethics and Discipline Committee of 
the Utah Supreme Court (the "Committee") on November 13, 2009, and an Order of 
Discipline: Public Reprimand (OPC File No. 08-0080—Henroid) issued by Respondent 
on November 24, 2009. 
B. Course of the Proceedings 
9 
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1. On October 3, 2007, the Office of Professional Conduct of the Utah State 
Bar ("OPC") mailed to Long a Notice of Informal Complaint in OPC File No. 07-0497. 
(See Shepard R. 000065.) On September 9, 2008, OPC mailed to Long a Notice of 
Informal Complaint in OPC File No. 08-0049. (See Nelson R. 000066.) On March 4, 
2008, OPC mailed to Long a Notice of Informal Complaint in OPC File No. 08-0080. 
(See Henroid R. 000038.) 
2. Long timely responded to each Notice of Informal Complaint. (See 
Shepard R. 000070; Nelson R. 000078; Henroid R. 000053.) On February 19, 2009, a 
Screening Panel hearing was held on all three matters.4 
3. On May 21, 2009, the Screening Panel issued its Findings of Fact, 
Conclusions of Law, and Recommendation of Discipline: Admonition in OPC File No. 
07-0497 (hereinafter "Shepard Recommendation"). 
4. On July 2, 2009, the Screening Panel issued its Findings of Fact, 
Conclusions of Law, and Recommendation of Discipline: Public Reprimand in OPC File 
No. 08-0049 (hereinafter "Nelson Recommendation"). 
5. On June 10, 2009, the Screening Panel issued its Findings of Fact, 
Conclusions of Law, and Recommendation of Discipline: Public Reprimand in OPC File 
No. 08-0080 (hereinafter "Henroid Recommendation"). 
6. Long timely filed Exceptions to each of the Screening Panel 
Recommendations on or about July 1, 2009. After retaining new counsel and with 
4
 Concerned about the potential prejudicial effect of three disciplinary complaints being 
presented to the Screening Panel at one time, Long requested that separate hearings be 
scheduled. (Shepard R. 000239-45.) This request was denied. (Shepard R. 000232-38.) 
10 
permission from OPC, Long submitted new Exceptions in each matter on October 22, 
2009. 
7. A consolidated hearing on Exceptions before the Chair of the Ethics and 
Discipline Committee, Bruce Maak, was held October 28, 2009. 
8. On November 6, 2009, Mr. Maak issued a Ruling on Exception to 
Screening Panel Recommendation of Discipline in OPC File Nos. 07-0497 and 08-0049 
(hereinafter "Shepard Exceptions Ruling" and "Nelson Exceptions Ruling" respectively). 
The Ruling on Exception to Screening Panel Recommendation of Discipline in OPC File 
Nos. 08-0080 was issued November 17, 2009 (hereinafter "Henroid Exceptions Ruling"). 
9. An Order of Discipline: Admonition in OPC File No. 07-0497 and an Order 
of Discipline: Public Reprimand in OPC File No. 08-0049 were issued by the Committee 
on November 13, 2009 (hereinafter "Shepard Order" and "Nelson Order" respectively). 
An Order of Discipline: Public Reprimand in OPC File No. 08-0080 was issued on 
November 24, 2009 (hereinafter "Henroid Order"). 
10. On December 8, 2009, Long filed a Petition for Review or Petition for 
Extraordinary Relief for each Order of Discipline. Long also filed a Motion to Clarify 
Procedure for Review and a Motion to Consolidate for proposes of review before the 
Supreme Court. The Motion to Consolidate was granted on January 7, 2010. The 
Motion to Clarify was deferred for plenary consideration on January 19, 2010. 
11. On December 22, 2009, Long filed a Motion for Stay for each matter, 
seeking to stay publication of any notice of disciplinary action against Long in the Utah 
Bar Journal. The Motions for Stay were denied on January 18, 2010. 
11 
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C. Disposition at agency 
Following exhaustion of internal review within the Committee, an Order of 
Discipline: Admonition was issued in the Shepard matter on November 13, 2009. An 
Order of Discipline: Public Reprimand was issued in the Nelson matter on November 13, 
2009 and in the Henroid matter on November 24, 2009. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
A. Shepard Complaint: OPC File No. 07-0497: 
1. On October 3, 2007, OPC mailed to Long a Notice of Informal Complaint 
in OPC File No. 07-0497, arising from Long's representation of Steven Shepard. (See 
Shepard R. 000065.) 
2. Long initially met with Shepard after regular business hours, accompanied 
Shepard to Pretrial Services and court the next morning, and prepared for and attended a 
subsequent hearing. (Shepard R. 000071-73, 000207-213.) At the initial consultation, 
Long discussed with Shepard the immediate and potential consequences of his legal 
problem, goals of representation, and terms of payment. (See Shepard R. 000070-71.) 
3. Long reviewed the retainer agreement with Shepard in detail. Shepard 
initialed each paragraph and signed the agreement following the hearing the next 
morning. (Shepard R. 000196-97, 000209-10.) Shepard indicated that he did not believe 
he had hired Long, though he admitted to signing the retainer agreement. (Shepard R. 
000197-98.) Long believed he had been retained by Shepard. (Shepard R. 000210.) At 
675 -425618V1 
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the conclusion of the initial consultation, Shepard paid Long $100 to secure his 
representation the following morning. (Shepard R. 000194.) 
4. After being unable to come up with the money to pay Long's entire fee, 
Shepard testified that he contacted Long's office and told a secretary he had hired 
someone else. (Shepard R. 000198.) Later, Shepard received notice that he was being 
sued by a collection agent for Long's fee. (Shepard R. 000198-99.) 
5. The retainer agreement specifies the scope of representation and indicates 
that Long's flat fee for services is considered earned once substantial services have been 
performed by Long. Shepard initialed alongside each paragraph of the agreement. 
(Shepard R. 000097-99.) Shepard also signed a Flat Fee Payment Arrangement & 
Promissory Note, (Shepard R. 000103-04), and a Representation Requirements 
document. (Shepard R. 000106-07.) 
6. Long continued to work on Shepard's case, preparing for and attending 
another hearing a few weeks later. Upon arriving at the subsequent hearing, Long first 
became aware that Shepard had retained a different attorney. (Shepard R. 000211.) 
Shepard acknowledged at the hearing that Long attended the subsequent hearing, 
apparently unaware that he had been terminated. (Shepard R. 000204-05.) 
7. Long spent an approximate total of 6 hours on Shepard's case. (Shepard R. 
000213.) 
8. According to Long's testimony, the collection action against Shepard was 
filed by Express Recovery after it received a copy of the signed retainer agreement from 
Long's office. After Shepard contacted Long's office and protested the lawsuit, Long 
13 
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directed Express Recovery to cease their collection action. Shepard never paid Long 
anything beyond the initial $100 for services provided, which included after-hours initial 
consultation with Shepard, preparation of a court filing due that same day, preparation 
that same evening for a hearing the following morning, assistance at Pretrial Services the 
next morning, an and an appearance on behalf of Shepard at a hearing shortly thereafter 
which resulted in a positive result for Shepard. (Shepard R. 000194, 000200.) 
9. The Screening Panel issued Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law, and 
Recommendation of Discipline, recommending an Order of Discipline: Admonition for 
violations of Rules of Professional Conduct 1.5(a), regarding unreasonable fees; 3.1, 
regarding bringing an unmeritorious claim; 7.1 and 7.5(d), regarding use of a misleading 
firm name; and 8.4(a), misconduct. (See Shepard Recommendation, p.l.) A copy of the 
Shepard Recommendation is included in the Addendum hereto. 
10. The Screening Panel also considered as a mitigating factor that Long did 
not actually collect the full flat fee from Shepard, but instead resolved the dispute by 
directing the collections company to drop its claim. (See Shepard Recommendation, p.5.) 
11. In Exceptions proceedings, the Chair of the Committee, Bruce Maak, 
acknowledged that the Screening Panel's Findings of Fact do not enumerate the facts 
upon which the Screening Panel's decision was based. (See Shepard Exceptions Ruling, 
p.4 n.l.) Nevertheless, the Chair concluded that sufficient evidence did exist in the 
fi75 -4?c;fi1ftv1 
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record to sustain the Screening Panel's recommendation. (See Shepard Exceptions 
Ruling, pp.4-7.)5 
B. Nelson Complaint: OPC File No. 08-0049: 
12. On October 3, 2007, OPC mailed to Long a Notice of Informal Complaint 
in OPC File No. 07-0497, arising from Long's representation of David Merritt. (See 
Nelson R. 000065.) Gordon Nelson, Merritt's employer who arranged for Merritt's legal 
defense, is the actual complainant in this matter. 
13. Nelson's complaint alleged that Nelson paid a $750 retainer and signed a 
fee agreement arranging for Long's representation of Merritt. (See Nelson R. 000001.) 
Nelson alleged that Long failed to appear as agreed on Merritt's behalf, and failed to 
adequately represent Merritt. (See Nelson R. 000001-02.) 
14. Nelson claimed that Long's employee, Joe Scheeler, assured Nelson that 
Long would represent Merritt. After a second missed hearing, Nelson claims that 
Scheeler said he would handle the matter himself. (See Nelson R. 000002.) 
15. Long appeared at hearings on behalf of Merritt and also prepared various 
documents for Merritt's cases. (See Nelson R. 000129-210, 000231-236.) Scheeler was 
an employee of Long's firm who assisted with administrative tasks and client intake. 
5
 As discussed in Part I, infra, the Chair went to great lengths to muster scattered facts 
from the record and articulate a line of reasoning that the Screening Panel could have 
followed in order to arrive at its conclusions. However, it is important to note that the 
duty to state the basis of the Screening Panel's recommendation lies with the Screening 
Panel at the time the Panel makes its recommendation. See Rules of Professional 
Practice 14-510(b)(7), (9) (formerly 14-510(b)(5)(D), (E)). 
675 :425618vl 
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Scheeler, pursuant to his employment agreement, was to comply with the Rules of 
Professional Conduct. (See Nelson R. 000112.) 
16. Long was retained to represent Merritt in two criminal matters before the 
North Salt Lake Justice Court. Long appeared in these matters and later attempted to 
withdraw. When his motion to withdraw was denied, Long continued to represent 
Merritt until substituted by another attorney. (See Nelson R. 000129-210, 000231-236, 
000251.) During the same time period, Merritt was also involved in criminal and civil 
matters before the Second and Third District Courts. Long was not engaged to represent 
Merritt in these matters. (See Nelson R. 000082-89.) 
17. Nelson paid $1,850 to Long's office to retain Long. Ultimately, Long's 
representation of Merritt was terminated. (See Nelson R. 000238-39.) Although Long 
believes he earned the money paid, all funds were later refunded to Merritt. (See Nelson 
R. 000127.) 
18. At the Screening Panel hearing on this matter, substantial discussion 
centered around Long's 10-page employment agreement with Scheeler. (Unofficial 
Transcript of Nelson Screening Panel Hearing ("Nelson Transcript"), p.7.)6 
Upon deciding to file exceptions to the Screening Panel's recommendations, Mr. Long 
obtained the official recording of the Screening Panel hearings and submitted the same to 
CitiCourt for transcription. CitiCourt made certified transcriptions of the Shepard and 
Henroid matter, which are found in the record. However, CitiCourt reported that the 
recording quality of the Nelson matter was too poor to make a substantial transcription. 
In an effort to recreate some record of the evidence against Mr. Long, administrative 
personnel in attorney Charles Gruber's office transcribed as much of the Nelson hearing 
as could be heard and understood from the recording. This unofficial transcript was 
submitted with Mr. Long's Exception to the Nelson Recommendation, and is found in the 
record. 
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19. The employment agreement with Scheeler specifically provided that 
Scheeler was to notify clients that he is not a lawyer and was to refrain from extending 
legal advice. (Nelson Transcript, pp.4-5.) Nelson acknowledged in his complaint that 
Long "told my wife and David that Joe did not have a license to practice law in any 
way." (Nelson R. 000002.) Long primarily uses paralegals and non-lawyer assistants for 
client intake and screening, as well as for administrative support. (Nelson Transcript, 
p.3.) Clients were given a disclosure which indicated that non-lawyer assistants were not 
lawyers and could not give legal advice. (Nelson Transcript, p.3.) 
20. Referencing the allegation that Scheeler appeared on behalf of clients, Long 
recounted that on one occasion, Long was delayed in getting to the courthouse for a 
hearing on Merritt's behalf. Scheeler, who was present at the courthouse with Merritt, 
offered to "appear" at the hearing on behalf of Long. Long explicitly told Scheeler to 
inform the judge and the prosecutor that he was not a lawyer and explain Long's delay. 
Scheeler did so and the court rescheduled the hearing for a new date. (Nelson Transcript, 
pp.7-8.) The relevant dockets to not indicate that Scheeler ever appeared before the 
court. (Nelson R. 000046-65, 000231-236.) 
21. At one point, Long discovered Scheeler conducting an unauthorized 
mediation after hours and reaffirmed to Scheeler that such was unacceptable under the 
terms of their employment agreement. (Nelson Transcript, pp.4-5, 10.) Scheeler 
allegedly conducted a mediation without Long's knowledge, and prepared a document 
memorializing the parties' agreement. (Nelson Transcript, pp.5-6; Nelson R. 000002, 
000025-30). 
17 
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22. Scheeler was admonished and reprimanded by Long for overstepping his 
role as a paralegal assistant. Eventually, the employment relationship with Scheeler was 
terminated due to disagreement regarding the bounds of Scheeler's authority, his 
adherence to the terms and conditions of his employment contract, and his conduct in the 
workplace. (Nelson Transcript, p.6, 10.) 
23- The Screening Panel issued Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law, and 
Recommendation of Discipline, recommending an Order of Discipline: Public Reprimand 
for alleged violations of Rules of Professional Conduct 5.3(a), regarding failure to take 
measures to ensure employee conduct in compliance with the Rules; 5.5(a), regarding 
failure to supervise employees; and 8.4(a), misconduct. (See Nelson Recommendation, 
p.l.) A copy of the Nelson Recommendation is included in the Addendum hereto. 
24. In Exceptions proceedings, the Chair of the Committee, Bruce Maak, 
acknowledged that the Screening Panel's Findings of Fact lack "evidentiary detail," but 
maintained that they were sufficient. (See Nelson Exceptions Ruling, p.6.) The Chair 
also concluded that sufficient evidence did exist in the record to sustain the Screening 
Panel's recommendation. (See Nelson Exceptions Ruling, p.2-8.) 
C. Henroid Complaint: OPC File No. 08-0080: 
25. On March 4, 2008, OPC mailed to Long a Notice of Informal Complaint in 
OPC File No. 08-0080, arising from Long's representation of Annallicia Vantreese, Mark 
Leroy Kenney, and Jose Luis Perez-Hernandez. (See Henroid R. 000038.) 
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26. The informal complaint was prompted by a letter from Judge Stephen L. 
Henroid, who reported that each client had been overcharged for legal services by Long, 
who he believed performed insubstantial work before withdrawing from each case. (See 
Henroid R. 000001.) None of the clients who are the subject of Judge Henroid's concern 
have complained of Long's representation. 
27. Long contends that his representation of each client was complete and 
diligent, and that he earned the flat fee charged in each case. Long worked 
approximately 45 hours on the Vantreese matter, 10 hours on the Kenney matter, and 50-
60 hours on the Perez-Hernandez matter. (Henroid R. 000059, 000599-600.) 
28. Most of Long's work on behalf of each client was completed outside the 
courtroom. Thus, Judge Henroid may have been unaware of the full extent of Long's 
work on behalf of each client. (Henroid R. 000668.) 
29. Long made numerous appearances in each case, filed motions, 
corresponded with opposing counsel, reviewed documents and evidence and conducted 
research, and counseled each client regarding their legal and personal problems and goals 
of representation. (Henroid R. 000002-35, 00064-78, 000095-105, 000127-253, 000278-
89, 000303-09, 000326-46, 000370-485, 000499-525, 000533-534, 000540.) 
30. The retainer agreement for each client specifies the scope of representation 
and indicates that Long's flat fee for services is considered earned once substantial 
services have been performed. Each client signed the retainer agreement. (Henroid R. 
000085-87, 000318-22, 000487-490.) Kenney and Perez-Hernandez also signed a Flat 
Fee Payment Arrangement & Promissory Note, while Vantreese paid in full. (Henroid R. 
19 
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000103-04, 000323-24, 000494-95.) Each signed a Representation Requirements 
document. (HenroidR. 000081-82, 000320-21, 000492-93.) 
31. Flat fees are appropriate and customary in Utah for criminal matters, and 
Long's rates are comparable to those of other criminal defense attorneys in the area. 
(Henroid R. 000060, 000601, 000676-77. See also Utah Ethics Advisory Opinion No. 
136 (1993).) 
32. No evidence was presented at the hearing that flat fees were inappropriate 
under the circumstances, or that Long's flat fee was unreasonable. Aside from testimony 
presented by Long, no testimony, expert or otherwise, was offered that would establish 
what would be a reasonable fee for the services performed by Long. 
33. Attorneys customarily do not attend drug court hearings unless some sort of 
problem is anticipated. (Henroid R. 000636-39, 000658-59.) Long remained involved in 
each case, and remained available to counsel each client until the conclusion of their legal 
matter or termination of the attorney-client relationship. (Henroid R. 000640-41, 
000660.) 
34. Judge Henroid appears to have been mistaken regarding several acts alleged 
in his letter. For example, Judge Henroid mistakenly complained that Long withdrew 
from all three cases, leaving the clients to the Legal Defender's Association. (See 
Henroid R. 000038.) In fact, Long remained involved in two of the three cases to their 
conclusion, and was terminated by the third client. (Henroid R. 000640-41, 000660, 
000664-65.) 
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35. Regarding the firm name issue, Long is presently a solo practitioner, but 
has employed additional attorneys at his firm from time to time. (Henroid R. 000606-
609.) Long also occasionally associates with other attorneys in the area, although not as 
employees. (Henroid R. 000607.) While at all times relevant to this matter there were no 
additional attorneys employed by Long, no one ever represented to clients that there were 
multiple attorneys at the firm and clients were consistently informed that only Long 
would be their lawyer. (Henroid R. 000609-610.)7 No testimony at the hearing or other 
evidence in the record indicates that any client or member of the public has been misled 
in this regard. 
36. The Screening Panel issued Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law, and 
Recommendation of Discipline, recommending an Order of Discipline: Public Reprimand 
for alleged violations of Rules of Professional Conduct 1.5(a), regarding unreasonable 
fees; 7.1 and 7.5(d), regarding use of a misleading firm name; and 8.4(a), misconduct. 
(See Henroid Recommendation, p.l.) A copy of the Henroid Recommendation is 
included in the Addendum hereto. 
37. The Screening Panel made no findings of fact regarding the amounts 
actually charged by Long or the nature and extent of the work completed by him for each 
client. See Addendum, Exhibit I. 
38. In Exceptions proceedings, the Chair of the Committee, Bruce Maak, 
acknowledged that the Screening Panel's Findings of Fact lack "evidentiary detail" and 
7
 Although the firm name issue arises in each of the three matters below, it was only 
discussed during the portion of the Screening Panel Hearing which concerned the 
Henroid matter. 
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indicated that the findings do not "articulate the specific evidence that the Screening 
Panel believed and disbelieved and the analytical process by which the Panel came" to its 
conclusion. (See Henroid Exceptions Ruling, p.6.) Nevertheless, Mr. Maak concluded 
that the findings were sufficient. (See Henroid Exceptions Ruling, pp.2-11.) 
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
In ordering discipline against Petitioner Larry N. Long, the Committee adopted the 
Screening Panel's Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law, and Recommendation of 
Discipline in each matter. However, in each matter the Screening Panel's disciplinary 
recommendation is improper. In arriving at its recommendation, the Screening Panel did 
not adequately articulate findings of fact which would justify its conclusions of law as 
required by the Rules of Professional Practice, failed to arrive at a decision based upon 
the substantial evidence in the record, misinterpreted the relevant Utah Rules of 
Professional Conduct, and recommended discipline which is unreasonable and 
inconsistent with discipline imposed for similar offenses and the stated purpose of the 
Rules of Professional Practice. Accordingly, each Order of Discipline is unfounded and 
improper. 
ARGUMENT 
The Utah Supreme Court has recognized "that there is a presumption of innocence 
in a disciplinary proceeding involving a license to practice law." In re Macfarlane, 350 
P.2d 631, 637 (Utah 1960). Rule 14-517 of the Rules of Professional Practice places the 
burden upon the OPC to prove a complaint of misconduct by a preponderance of the 
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evidence. In the present case, the evidence simply does not support a finding that Long 
violated Rules of Professional Conduct 1.5(a), 3.1, 5.3(a), or 5.5(a), and the 
circumstances of Long's violation of Rules 7.1 and 7.5(d) do not warrant the sanction 
imposed. Moreover, the findings and conclusions relied upon by the Committee fail to 
afford Long due process of law required by the Rules of Professional Practice and this 
Court's prior decisions. 
I. The Ethics and Discipline Committee Failed to Articulate Findings of Fact 
Which Would Justify Its Conclusions of Law: 
Due process requires that Long be apprised of the charges and facts against him. 
See Superintendent, Massachusetts Correctional Institution v. Hill, 472 U.S. 445, 455 
(1985) (noting that due process requires a disciplinary board "to explain the evidence 
relied upon"). Similarly, Rule 14-510(b)(7) of the Rules of Professional Practice requires 
that after the Screening Panel reviews all the facts developed by the informal complaint, 
answer, investigation and hearing, the Screening Panel is to then make a recommendation 
for public reprimand in writing, stating "the substance and nature of the informal 
complaint and defenses and the basis upon which the screening panel has concluded, 
by a preponderance of the evidence, that the respondent should be admonished or 
publicly reprimanded." Rules of Professional Practice 14-510(b)(7) (formerly 14-
510(b)(5)(E) (emphasis added). In each matter, the Screening Panel failed to state the 
facts upon which it based its conclusions, articulating no specific facts and citing no 
specific evidence from the record to support each conclusion. Indeed, most of the 
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Findings of Fact are stated not as facts supporting a conclusion, but as conclusions 
themselves. 
According to Rule of Professional Practice 14-510(d)(3) (formerly 14-510(c)), a 
respondent must be given the opportunity to show that the Screening Panel's 
recommendation "is unsupported by substantial evidence or is arbitrary, capricious, 
legally insufficient or otherwise clearly erroneous." The Utah Supreme Court has held 
that in cases of attorney disciplinary proceedings, "the seriousness of alleged violations 
of a lawyer's professional responsibility requires that a lawyer be afforded an opportunity 
to defend his or her good professional standing." Nemelka, 2009 UT 33, |^ 19; see also 
Harding, 2004 UT 100, fflf 20-21 (holding that a written report of the Screening Panel's 
findings and conclusions must be given to the lawyer to ensure due process to the lawyer 
accused of misconduct.). 
The Utah Supreme Court has stated that factual findings of the bar are treated 
"much the same as findings of administrative agencies." Schwenke, 849 P.2dt 576. In 
the agency context, Utah appellate courts have held that due process requires a tribunal's 
decision to be supported by findings of fact sufficient to permit review. See Milne Truck 
Lines v. Public Service Commission, 720 P.2d 1373, 1378 (Utah 1986) ("It is also 
essential that the [agency] make subsidiary findings in sufficient detail that the critical 
subordinate factual issues are highlighted and resolved in such a fashion as 
to demonstrate that there is a logical and legal basis for the ultimate conclusions. . . ."); 
LaSal Oil Co. v. Department of Envtl Quality, 843 P.2d 1045, 1047 (Utah Ct. App. 1992) 
("An administrative agency must make findings of fact and conclusions of law that are 
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adequately detailed so as to permit meaningful appellate review."). This basic principle 
of due process is repeated in other contexts as well. See Mosdell v. Mosdell, 2001 UT 
App 115, % 4 ("Here, the trial court's findings of fact and conclusions of law are 
insufficient to support its order . . . . With such meager findings, this court cannot 
meaningfully review whether the trial court abused its discretion."); State v. Pharris, 846 
P.2d 454, 464 (Utah Ct. App. 1993) (stating that the need to review a decision for 
correctness requires that a trial court create a complete record, and that "merely 
recording] incomplete, conclusory statements in its findings of fact" required the court to 
remand the case for an evidentiary hearing); Woodward v. Fazzio, 823 P.2d 474, 478 
(Utah Ct. App. 1991) (holding that a trial court's findings of fact merely reflected the 
court's desire to arrive at the necessary conclusions of law, the court found the statements 
conclusory and insufficient because they "provide no insight into the evidentiary basis for 
the trial court's decision and render effective appellate review unfeasible"). 
In the matters at issue, Long is denied the ability to adequately defend his good 
professional standing. Without knowing the basis of the Screening Panel's 
recommendation, Long is impeded in contesting the substance of the recommendation. 
In each Ruling on Exceptions, Mr. Maak concedes that the findings of fact lack 
"evidentiary detail." Shepard Exceptions Ruling, p.4 n.l; Nelson Exceptions Ruling, p.6; 
Henroid Exceptions Ruling, p.6. While the term "evidentiary detail" is never explained, 
Mr. Maak does elaborate in the Henroid Exceptions Ruling that the findings do not 
"articulate the specific evidence that the Screening Panel believed and disbelieved and 
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the analytical process by which the Panel came" to its conclusion. Henroid Exceptions 
Ruling, p.6. Mr. Maak concludes that this level of detail is not required. Id. p.6-7. 
Long asserts that the level of detail excused by Mr. Maak is precisely what is 
required by the Rules and by due process. Proper findings of fact should contain "those 
facts on each issue which are necessary to make flow from them the law conclusion or 
make such law conclusions intelligible." Sandall v. Hoskins, 137 P.2d 819, 822 (Utah 
1943). As this Court explained in Milne Truck Lines: 
The importance of complete, accurate, and consistent findings of fact is 
essential to a proper determination by an administrative agency. To that 
end, findings should be sufficiently detailed to disclose the steps by which 
the ultimate factual conclusions, or conclusions of mixed law and fact, are 
reached. Without such findings, this Court cannot perform its duty of 
reviewing the Commission's order in accordance with established legal 
principles and of protecting the parties and the public from arbitrary and 
capricious administrative action. 
720P.2datl378. 
In each Exceptions Ruling, Mr. Maak goes to great lengths to gather scattered 
facts from the record and offer a line of reasoning that the Screening Panel could have 
followed in order to arrive at its conclusions. For example, in the Shepard Exceptions 
Ruling, Mr. Maak justifies the Screening Panel's decision by referring to evidence that 
"the Panel believed or could have believed" Shepard Exceptions Ruling, p.5 (emphasis 
added). Similarly, in the Henroid Exceptions Ruling, Mr. Maak discusses what the 
Screening Panel "could have concluded' and "could have chosen not to believe" 
Henroid Exceptions Ruling, p.5 (emphasis added). In each case, we are left to guess as to 
what evidence the Screening Panel accepted and rejected, and speculate as to whether 
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their legal analysis was sound—a practice certainly not contemplated by Rule 14-
510(b)(7) (requiring the Screening Panel to "state . . . the basis upon which the screening 
panel has concluded, by a preponderance of the evidence, that the respondent should be 
admonished or publicly reprimanded.") The facts upon which the Panel relied are not 
identified, and the basis of their decision is not explained. 
Notwithstanding Mr. Maak's efforts to justify the Screening Panel's 
recommendations, the requirements of the Rules of Professional Practice have not been 
met. The duty to state the basis of the Screening Panel's recommendation lies with the 
Screening Panel at the time the Panel makes its recommendation. See Rules of 
Professional Practice 14-510(b)(7), (9) (formerly 14-510(b)(5)(D), (E)). Any subsequent 
attempt by the Chair to connect the dots and justify the conclusions does not cure the 
Panel's failure. Rule 14-510 is designed so that an attorney facing a disciplinary 
recommendation may analyze the recommendation and take exception to its findings and 
conclusions. Without adequate findings and conclusions, the Rule is deprived of its 
effectiveness and the attorney is deprived of due process of law. 
Here, the facts and conclusions offered by the Screening Panel do not adequately 
apprise Long of the basis of the decision against him. Such a defect materially hinders 
Long's ability to take exception to the recommendation, as well as in the current 
proceedings. Failure to comply with Article 5 of the Rules of Professional Practice is 
grounds for dismissal of a disciplinary action. See Rule of Professional Practice 14-
510(f)(5)(D). Accordingly, the Screening Panel's recommendation should be disregarded 
and the charges should be dismissed. 
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II. The Screening Panel's Recommendation Was Not Based Upon Substantial 
Evidence: 
An attorney is entitled to due process in disciplinary actions. Sonnenreich, 2004 
UT 3, Tf 37. An essential characteristic of due process is that decisions be based upon 
evidence. See McGrew v. Industrial Comm'n, 85 P.2d 608, 618 (Utah 1938). In a 
context similar to this matter, the Utah Supreme Court held that due process requires 
"adjudicating the charges based upon the evidence adduced at the hearing." Anderson, 
2004 UT 7, f 52 (concerning judicial misconduct). 
In reviewing recommendations for discipline by the state bar, the Utah Supreme 
Court has stated that factual findings of the bar are sustained only "so long as they are 
supported by substantial evidence." Schwenke, 849 P.2d at 576. "Substantial evidence is 
something less than the weight of the evidence, but more than a mere scintilla of 
evidence," enough that a reasonable mind might consider adequate to support a 
conclusion. Martinez v. Media-Paymaster Plus/Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-Day 
Saints, 2007 UT 42, f 35, 164 P.3d 384. In addition, this Court has held that a 
"'residuum of legal evidence competent in a court of law'" must support any agency 
finding. Beehive Tel Co. v. PSC of Utah, 2004 UT 18, ^ 39, 89 P.3d 131 (quoting Lake 
Shore Motor Coach Lines, Inc. v. Welling, 339 P.2d 1011, 1014 (Utah 1959)). In other 
words, a finding of fact cannot be based solely on hearsay. Sandy State Bank v. Brimhall, 
636 P.2d 481, 486 (Utah 1981). 
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In the administrative setting, the Utah Supreme Court had held that an 
adjudicatory panel "cannot act on their own information. . . . Their findings must be 
based on evidence presented in the case. . . ." Morris v. Public Serv. Comm% 321 P.2d 
644, 646 (Utah 1958). For example, where a finding of intent was necessary for 
imposition of a penalty by the state tax commission, the Utah Court of Appeals 
disapproved of the commission's findings on the grounds that the commission had merely 
made a "mechanical conclusion" regarding the necessary elements of the charge. See 
Clements v. Utah State Tax Comm% 893 P.2d 1078, 1082 (Utah Ct. App. 1995). The 
court remanded, requiring specific findings as to whether the necessary elements of the 
charge were met. See id. 
In each of the matters at issue, the record lacks sufficient evidence to support the 
o 
Screening Panel's findings and conclusions. 
A. Shepard Complaint: 
In its findings for the Shepard matter, the Screening Panel found as a matter of fact 
that "Mr. Long charged an unreasonable fee for services rendered," and concluded as a 
matter of law that u[b]y charging Mr. Shepard an unreasonable fee for services rendered, 
Mr. Long violated this rule." See Shepard Recommendation, p.2-5. However, the record 
does not support either of these statements. Although ample evidence of Long's fees and 
8
 We recognize our obligation under Utah R. App. P. 24(a)(9) to "marshal all record 
evidence that supports the challenged finding." To that end, we have attempted to set 
forth in the statement of facts all relevant facts whether they support or contradict the 
Screening Panel's recommendation. Where facts are disputed, we have endeavored to 
included both. See, e.g., Fact No. 3. However, please note that the record is devoid of 
facts which would support many of the challenged findings. Long cannot marshal 
evidence where no evidence exists. 
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activities is found in the record, there is no evidence indicating what would constitute an 
"excessive" fee or suggesting that Long's fees exceed customary charges in the area for 
similar cases or otherwise violate Rule 1.5(a). 
The evidence cited by Mr. Maak is insufficient to support the Screening Panel's 
recommendation. Not only is such evidence not enough, in light of the remainder of the 
record, to be reasonably considered adequate to support a conclusion, Martinez, 2007 UT 
42, % 35, but the record lacks evidence concerning several elements of the offenses 
charged. For example, no one but Long testified concerning the reasonableness of his 
fees and work done on behalf of Shepard. Long explained the basis of his fee and 
detailed his work, including time spent with Shepard and work done preparing for 
Shepard's case. Shepard R. 000070-73, 000207-213. Similarly, there is no evidence in 
the record that would support a finding that the collections claim against Shepard was 
without merit. Long has a legitimate claim both in quantum meruit as well based upon 
the signed retainer agreement. Shepard R. 000219-20. [cite case] It is not sufficient to 
conclude that "[t]he Screening Panel accepted Shepard's version of things." Shepard 
Exceptions Ruling, p.3-4. Even accepting all of Shepard's testimony as true, the record 
still lacks evidence to sustain each element of the recommended discipline. 
The record plainly lacks, and the findings of fact and conclusions of law fail to 
refer to, substantial evidence sufficient to support finding violations of Rules in question. 
The finding of fact that "Mr. Long charged an unreasonable fee for services rendered" is 
a perfect example of a "mechanical conclusion," wholly lacking any specific factual 
findings as to the necessary elements of the charged violation. As the Utah Supreme 
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Court has held, "[c]ommon sense likewise requires a holding that the findings required by 
statute be made in accordance with the evidence so presented. If there is no substantial 
evidence to support an essential finding, that finding cannot stand and [an] order 
predicated upon it must fall." Mountain States Tel & Tel Co. v. Public Serv. Comm 'n, 
145 P.2d 790, 792 (Utah 1944). Accordingly, the Order of Discipline for violating Rules 
1.5(a) and 3.1 should be vacated for being unsupported by the evidence in the record. 
B. Nelson Complaint: 
In the Nelson matter, the record lacks sufficient evidence to support several of the 
Screening Panel's findings and conclusions. The Screening Panel found as a matter of 
fact that "Mr. Long failed to effect measures to make reasonably certain that Mr. Scheeler 
as his employee complied with the Rules of Professional Conduct" and that "Mr. Long 
failed to adequately supervise Joe Scheeler's activities," concluding as a matter of law 
that "[b]y failing to effect measures to make reasonably certain that Mr. Long's 
employees complied with the Rules of Professional Conduct Mr. Long violated [Rule 
5.3(a)]" and "By failing to adequately supervise Mr. Scheeler's activities to insure that 
Mr. Scheeler was not engaging in the Unauthorized Practice of Law [sic] and by allowing 
Mr. Scheeler to hold himself out as a lawyer, Mr. Long violated [Rule 5.5(a)]." See 
Nelson Recommendation, pp.2-4. There is insufficient evidence in the record to support 
these findings and conclusions. 
No other party testified at the hearing on the Nelson matter. According to Mr. 
Maak, the Screening Panel must have inferred from the evidence that Long was not only 
aware of his employee's alleged misconduct, but "sought to take advantage of Scheeler's 
31 
675 -425618V1 
improper actions." Nelson Exceptions Ruling, p.5. Such an inference is not only against 
the weight of the evidence, but also wholly unexplained by the Screening Panel's 
findings and conclusions. Though it is certainly possible that the Screening Panel 
followed Mr. Maak's line of reasoning, Mr. Maak, like Long, is only able to venture a 
guess as to the Screening Panel's actual analysis. 
The record shows Long's efforts to ensure Scheeler's compliance with the rules. 
The record also references the written agreement Long had with Scheeler concerning 
compliance with the Rules, and specific instructions and discipline Long directed at 
Sheeler to ensure his compliance with the Rules. In addition, the Screening Panel's 
finding that Long "allowed Mr. Scheeler to appear in court, contact opposing party [sic] 
and conduct mediation proceedings at Mr. Long's office" is not only unsupported by any 
evidence in the record, but is contrary to testimony of Long at the hearing and the court 
docket found in the record. Nelson R. 000046-65; Nelson Transcript, pp.7-8. 
C. Henroid Complaint: 
Similarly, the record in the Henroid matter lacks sufficient evidence to support 
several of the Screening Panel's findings and conclusions. For example, the Screening 
Panel found as a matter of fact that "Mr. Long charged excessive fees for the work he 
completed in the Vantreese matter and the Perez Hernandez matter," and concluded as a 
matter of law that "[b]y charging excessive fees for work he performed in two cases, Mr. 
Long violated Rule 1.5(a) (Fees)." See Henroid Recommendation, pp.2-5. However, 
there is no evidence in the record which would support either of these statements. 
Indeed, no such evidence was even proffered. 
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Long's fees and activities in the three cases before Judge Henroid are well-
documented. See Fact No. 29. There is no evidence indicating what would constitute an 
"excessive fee" or suggesting that Long's fees exceed customary charges in the area for 
similar cases or otherwise violate Rule 1.5(a). In fact, no one but Long testified 
concerning the reasonableness of the fees of activities of Long. Long explained the basis 
of his fees, detailed his work on behalf of each client, and testified that his charges and 
methods are typical in the area for similar cases. See Henroid R. 000601, 000676-77. 
The evidence in the record indicates each of the fees in question were reasonable, and 
Long earned each fee. 
In his Ruling on Exceptions, Mr. Maak concludes that "[t]he Screening Panel was 
not obligated to believe Long's written retrospective accounting, supported with no 
contemporaneous records that were introduced, of services he performed." Henroid 
Exceptions Ruling, p.5. While Long certainly does not argue with this proposition, it 
does not justify the Screening Panel's recommendation. The Screening Panel's decision 
must be based on the evidence. See Rules of Professional Practice 14-510(b)(7). Where 
evidence conflicts, the Screening Panel may believe some, and reject another. However, 
the Screening Panel may not reject the only evidence in the record and base its decision 
on unsupported speculation. See Rule of Professional Practice 14-510(b)(7), (9) 
(indicating that a screening panel determination must be based upon a preponderance of 
the evidence). 
Here, Mr. Maak correctly notes that the Screening Panel is not obligated to believe 
Long. However, evidence supporting Long's position is the only evidence in the record. 
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Judge Henroid's letter is not evidence because it is not verified. See Rule of Professional 
Practice 14-510(a)(2) ("The informal complaint shall be notarized and contain a 
verification attesting to the accuracy of the information contained in the complaint."), 
Moreover, the letter recounts information relayed by Long's clients to Judge Henroid, 
which constitutes hearsay within hearsay. No evidence was presented nor testimony 
given that Long did not do sufficient work to earn his fee. There is no evidence in the 
record that Long charged an unreasonable fee. None of the clients complained of the fee 
they were charged. Accordingly, the Order of Discipline for violating Rule 1.5(a) should 
be vacated for being unsupported by substantial evidence. 
In the Henroid Exceptions Ruling, Mr. Maak offers the unsupported statement that 
while the Rules of Professional Practice do assure "due process and a reasonable record 
in the event of an Exception," the Rules "do not envision the level of detail and precision 
embraced with respect to civil and criminal proceedings." Henroid Exceptions Ruling, 
p.7 n.2. Mr. Maak concludes that "such detail and precision would not be practical or 
feasible" given that the Screening Panel is comprised of volunteers. 
In effect, the Chair of the Ethics and Discipline Committee appears to believe that 
although the Committee has the power to take disciplinary action against a lawyer's 
license, the fact-finding body upon which the Committee relies cannot be expected to act 
with "detail and precision." While the chair may consider detailed findings impractical, 
such findings are nevertheless required by the Rules of Professional Practice and this 
Court's prior decisions. 
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III. The Screening Panel Misinterpreted the Rules of Professional Conduct 
Erroneously Finding Violations of Rules 1.5 (a), 3.1, 53(a), 5.5(a), and 8.4(a): 
A. Rule 1.5(a) 
In evaluating the reasonableness of a fee, Utah R. Prof. Conduct 1.5(a) enumerates 
several factors to be considered. Factors relevant to this case include (1) the novelty and 
difficulty of legal issues; (3) the fee customarily charged in the locality for similar legal 
services; (4) results obtained; (5) time limitations imposed by the client or circumstances; 
(7) the experience and ability of the lawyer to perform the services; (8) whether the fee is 
fixed or contingent. In both the Shepard and Henroid matters, the Screening Panel and 
OPC appears to err in defining an unreasonable fee under Rule 1.5(a). 
Much of the concern over Long's fees is centered around Long's use of a flat fee 
agreement in his criminal practice. A flat fee, or task based billing, is an arrangement 
with the client that the lawyer will be paid a specific sum to complete the project. A flat 
fee may result in the attorney not receiving the full hourly rate normally charged. 
However, there is also the potential to receive compensation greater than a normal hourly 
rate. As explained by the Supreme Court of Arizona: 
A non-refundable flat fee reflects "a negotiated element of risk sharing 
between attorney and client" whereby the "attorney takes the risk that she 
will do more work than planned, without additional compensation; and the 
client, in return, agrees that the attorney will earn the agreed-upon amount, 
even if that amount would exceed the attorney's usual hourly rate. . . ." 
Because a non-refundable flat fee reflects a balancing of the risk to both 
client and lawyer, a flat fee can be larger than the fee generated by hourly 
rates without being excessive. 
In re Connelly, 55 P.3d 756, 761-762 (Ariz. 2002) (quoting In the Matter ofSwartz, 686 
P.2d 1236,1242-43 (Ariz. 1984)). 
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In the case of Stalls v. Pounders, 2005 Tenn. App. LEXIS 42 (Tenn. Ct. App. 
2005) the court used the following analysis to determine if a non-refundable fee 
agreement was enforceable. The court stated: 
This Court has long held that an attorney is entitled to compensation in the 
amount agreed upon by contract, provided that the contract is fair at its 
inception and entered into in good faith. . . . In order to prove such good 
faith and fairness, an attorney seeking to enforce a contract for attorney's 
fees must show: (1) the client fully understood the contract's meaning and 
effect, (2) the attorney and client shared the same understanding of the 
contract, and (3) the terms of the contract are just and reasonable. 
Id. at 14-15. The Ethics Advisory Committee of the Utah Supreme Court has likewise 
opined that flat fee or fixed fee arrangements do not violate Rule 1.5(a) so long as the fee 
is structured to avoid a chilling effect upon the client's right to terminate their lawyer. 
See Utah Ethics Advisory Opinion No. 136 (1993). In other words, a portion of the fee 
may need to be disgorged if the attorney-client relationship is terminated before 
substantial services are performed. See id. Notably, Long's fee agreement provides that 
the fee is not earned until substantial services are performed, and tracks the language of 
Utah Ethics Advisory Opinion No. 136. See, e.g., Shepard R. 000097 ("No portion of the 
flat fee will be refunded once substantial services have been performed, which would 
justify attorney retaining the fee."). 
1. Shepard Complaint: 
Rule 1.5(a) prohibits making an agreement for, charging, or collecting an 
unreasonable fee. In the Screening Panel Memo, OPC offers an incorrect standard for 
determining whether Long's fee is unreasonable. To the extent this standard was adopted 
by the Screening Panel, any discipline predicated thereon would be improper. 
36 
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The Screening Panel Memo attempted to use Long's fee agreement to define 
whether the fee was proper. The Shepard Screening Panel Memo recommended 
discipline upon a finding that Long "did not earn the $6,600 fee since Mr. Shepard did 
not pay the amount and under Mr. Long's Fee Agreement the fee is earned when payment 
is received." Shepard Screening Panel Memo, pp.5-6. Such a standard is not founded in 
the Rules of Professional Conduct. 
The retainer agreement between Long and Shepard merely dictates the payment 
expectation and terms between the parties, not the applicable Rules of Professional 
Conduct. Long did not violate Rule 1.5(a) because he did not make an agreement for, 
charge, or collect an unreasonable fee. Shepard approached Long seeking help with a 
felony DUI. Considering Shepard's prior convictions and the factual circumstances of 
the case, the legal matter was rather complicated. Shepard was potentially at risk of up to 
5 years. Imprisonment and a substantial fine. Additional factors properly considered and 
found in the record are that Shepard approached Long the night before he would need 
representation at a hearing, and Long has approximately 40 years of experience dealing 
with such matters. Long also presented evidence that $6,600 is within the range of fees 
customarily charged in Utah for this type of case. These factors, all appropriately 
considered under Rule 1.5(a), indicate that the fee agreed upon would have been 
reasonable had Long represented Shepard for the duration of the matter as contemplated 
by the parties when the fee agreement was signed. 
Similarly, the fee charged was reasonable. The fee agreement signed by Shepard 
indicated that the terms of representation provided for a flat fee. The fee would be 
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earned, in full, upon performance of any substantial work. Shepard signed the fee 
agreement—initialing each paragraph—after Long reviewed its provisions and details 
following the hearing. Shepard R. 000097-99, 000209-10. The record shows that Long 
performed substantial work for Shepard. It was reasonable for Long to conclude, based 
on the fee agreement, that he was justified in charging the agreed-upon fee. 
Lastly, the fee collected was reasonable. Long did an after-hours initial 
consultation with Shepard, prepared and faxed a document due by midnight that day, 
prepared that same evening for a hearing the following morning, accompanied Shepard at 
8:00 a.m. the following morning to Pretrial Services, appeared on behalf of Shepard at a 
hearing shortly thereafter, and attained a positive result for Shepard at the hearing. See 
Fact No. 2, 6. The actual fee collected by Long was only $100. Considering the 6 hours 
of work Long testified he completed in Shepard's case, this was not an unreasonable fee. 
As noted above, nothing in the record supports a conclusion that the fee agreed 
upon or collected in the Shepard matter was unreasonable. In contrast, Long testified and 
presented evidence regarding the nature and extent of his services and the basis of his fee. 
This uncontroverted evidence requires that the Screening Panel's recommendation of 
discipline be disregarded, and the charges against Long dismissed. 
2. Henroid Complaint: 
In the Henroid matter, the Screening Panel again adopted an incorrect standard for 
Rule 1.5(a) offered by OPC in its Screening Panel Memo. OPC suggested, and the 
Screening Panel found, that Long charged "excessive" fees. See Henroid Screening 
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Panel Memo, p. 12; Henroid Recommendation, p.2. Rule 1.5(a) does not attempt to 
define whether a fee is "excessive," only whether it is "reasonable." 
The Screening Panel concluded that Long's fee was "excessive," as opposed to the 
correct standard of unreasonable, in the Vantreese and Perez-Hernandez matters. As 
noted above, there is no evidence or testimony in the record to that effect. In fact, 
nothing in the record supports a conclusion that the fees charged in the Vantreese and 
Perez-Hernandez matters were unreasonable, save the initial letter from Judge Henroid 
complaining of Long's fees, which is not evidence in this matter and is hearsay within 
hearsay. Similarly, OPC's statement in the Notice of Informal Complaint that "the 
docket reflects that you performed minimal work" reflects an incomplete assessment of 
the facts and improper legal standard for Rule 1.5(a). Obviously not all work performed 
by an attorney is recorded in a court's docket. It would be incorrect to conclude that only 
docketed acts are considered in determining the reasonableness of a fee. 
In contrast, Long testified and presented evidence regarding the nature and extent 
of his services and the basis of his fee. OPC failed to even proffer evidence to dispute 
Long's contentions. This uncontroverted evidence requires a finding that Long did not 
charge an unreasonable fee to any client in the Henroid matter. 
B. Rule 3.1 
Rule 3.1 prohibits a lawyer from bringing a claim unless there is a basis in law and 
fact for doing so that is not frivolous. The rule requires only that a lawyer be able to 
make a good faith argument in support of their position. See Utah R. Prof. Conduct 3.1, 
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comment 2. In the present case, the Screening Panel made an erroneous finding of fact in 
concluding that the collection claim against Shepard was frivolous. 
The fee agreement between Long and Shepard indicated that the fee agreed upon 
by the parties was considered earned once Long performed substantial legal services for 
the client. See Shepard R. 000097. As explained above, Long performed substantial 
services for Shepard when he completed approximately 6 hours of legal work for 
Shepard, consulted with him after hours, drafted and faxed a request to the court which 
was due my midnight the day Long was engaged, represented Shepard before Pretrial 
Services and at a hearing, and prepared for a subsequent hearing. See Fact No. 2, 6-7. 
After Long represented Shepard at the hearing the next morning, Shepard signed the Fee 
Agreement and initialed each paragraph as it was explained to him. Shepard R. 000209. 
Although Shepard ultimately decided to retain another attorney, Long had a reasonable 
contractual expectation that he would receive the flat fee agreed upon, and was within his 
rights to seek that fee. 
Other courts considering this issue have held that an attorney would be justified in 
attempting to enforce a flat fee agreement. As noted above, the Tennessee Court of 
Appeals held that an attorney is entitled to enforce a fee agreement so long as the 
agreement is "fair at its inception and entered into in good faith." Stalls9 2005 Tenn. 
App. LEXIS 42, 14-15. Taking a different approach, the Oklahoma Supreme Court held 
that even where a flat fee contract may be unenforceable in full, an attorney may recover 
damages in quanum meruit or contractual damages if, in entering into such a contract, the 
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attorney changed positions or incurred expenses. McQueen, Rains & Tresch, LLP v. 
Citgo Petroleum Corp., 195 P. 3d 35, 44 (Okla. 2008). 
At the Screening Panel Hearing, Long argued both a contractual basis for 
enforcing the contract, and a claim in quantum meruit. The record shows that Long 
performed substantial services on Shepard's behalf. Shepard knowingly and intentionally 
signed the retainer agreement after Long commenced the representation and reviewed 
each paragraph with Shepard. It is simple error to conclude from this evidence that Long 
did not have a good faith claim to compensation either under the contract or in quantum 
meruit, and there is no evidence that Long was attempting to use the collection action to 
extract an unreasonable fee or limit the client's ability to terminate representation.9 
Because Long could make a good faith argument that he was entitled to the fee sought, 
no action to collect that fee could be considered in violation of Rule 3.1. 
C. Rule 5.3(a) 
Rule 5.3(a) requires a supervising lawyer to "make reasonable efforts to ensure 
that the firm has in effect measures giving reasonable assurance that the person's conduct 
is compatible with the professional obligations of the lawyer." Comment 1 states that a 
lawyer must give assistants "appropriate instruction and supervision." 
In the Nelson Screening Panel Memo, OPC once again suggests an incorrect legal 
standard with respect to Rule 5.3(a). OPC directs that Long should be found to have 
9
 In fact, the undisputed evidence shows that as soon as Long became aware of the 
collection lawsuit, he directed that the claim should be dropped. This stands in stark 
contrast to Fla. Bar v. Richardson, 547 So. 2d 60 (Fla. 1990), where a lawyer was found 
to have violated Rule 3.1 after "obsessive" attempts to vacate a court order requiring him 
to refund an excessive fee. 
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violated the rule if Long's non-lawyer employee drafted a document that only a lawyer 
may draft under Rule 2.4(c) or Long's non-lawyer employee contacted an opposing party 
represented by counsel. See Nelson Screening Panel Memo, pp.9-10. As noted above, 
Rule 5.3(a) only requires "reasonable efforts" to give "reasonable assurance" that an 
assistant's conduct will comply with the Rules. A finding that a non-lawyer employee 
violated a Rule does not necessarily lead to the conclusion that Rule 5.3(a) was violated. 
The Arizona Supreme Court in In re Galbasini, 786 P.2d 971, 975 (Ariz. 1990), stated 
well: 
An attorney who supervises a nonlawyer associate is not required to 
guarantee that the associate will never engage in "incompatible" conduct, 
for that would be tantamount to vicarious liability. . . . Circumstances will 
dictate what constitutes a "reasonable effort" to instill in nonlawyer 
personnel an appropriate respect for their duties. Certainly new personnel 
must be carefully screened and given at least some instruction in the 
fundamentals of professional responsibility. 
Id. (quoting G. Hazard, Jr., & W. Hodes, THE LAW OF LAWYERING: A HANDBOOK ON 
THE MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT, p. 464 (1989)). 
OPC misconstrued Rule 5.3(a) by implying that Long is strictly liable for acts of a 
non-lawyer assistant which violate the Rules of Professional Conduct. Even if Scheeler 
improperly drafted documents or held himself out to be a lawyer, such conduct would not 
automatically mean that Long violated Rule 5.3(a). To the extent that the Screening 
Panel adopted OPC's flawed reasoning, the Panel's recommendation is improper. 
Other jurisdictions have held with respect to Rule 5.3 that "[although there may 
often be some question of what is a reasonable effort to ensure proper conduct by 
nonlawyer employees, at a minimum the lawyer must screen, instruct, and supervise. " In 
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re Struthers, 877 P.2d 789 (Ariz. 1994). The Screening Panel correctly stated that Long 
could be found to have violated Rule 5.3(a) if he failed to have in effect measures to 
make "reasonably certain" that his employee's conduct complied with the Rules of 
Professional Conduct. However, the Screening Panel made no findings of fact, other than 
the unsupported and conclusory statement in \ 10 of its findings of fact, that Long failed 
to design and implement such measures. Moreover, there is no evidence in the record 
that suggests Long failed to adequately have in place measures designed to prevent 
unethical conduct by non-lawyer assistants. To the contrary, Long had a written 
agreement with Scheeler requiring his strict compliance with the Rules. Nelson 
Transcript, p.7. See also People v. Smith, 74 P.3d 566, 571 (Colo. 2003) ("The evidence 
presented, however, revealed that Smith did have measures in place to reasonably assure 
that . . . Ross would conduct herself in such a manner as was compatible with his 
professional responsibilities. Ross didn't follow those measures. Since such measures 
were in place, the charged violation of Colo. RPC 5.3(a) is dismissed."). 
In the Nelson Exceptions Ruling, Mr. Maak makes the argument that Scheeler's 
conduct, some of which may have violated the Rules, implies that Long's effort to control 
Scheeler were not reasonable. Rule 5.3(a) requires that a managerial lawyer make 
"reasonable efforts" to ensure ethical conduct, not that the lawyer's efforts be 
impenetrable. Evidence in the record shows that Long took action even before Scheeler 
was hired to ensure his compliance with the Rules of Professional conduct. Ultimately, 
Long and Scheeler's employment relationship was terminated in part due to non-
compliance with that agreement and the Rules of Professional Conduct. It is simply 
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contrary to the evidence in the record to conclude that Long failed to make reasonable 
efforts to ensure the ethical conduct of his employees. 
D. Rule 5.5(a) 
Rule 5.5(a) directs that a lawyer may not engage in, or assist another in engaging 
in, the unauthorized practice of law. Rule 14-802(b) of the Rules Professional Practice 
defines the "practice of law" as "the representation of the interests of another person by 
informing, counseling, advising, assisting, advocating for or drafting documents for that 
person through application of the law and associated legal principles to that person's facts 
and circumstances." The rule specifically excludes from the practice of law 
"[representing a party in any mediation proceeding" and "[sjerving in a neutral capacity 
as a mediator, arbitrator or conciliator." Rule of Professional Practice 14-802(c)(7), (9). 
In the Screening Panel Memo, OPC suggests that Long violated Rule 5.5(a) if he 
assisted Scheeler in attempting to practice law "by drafting documents that only lawyer 
mediators may draft." Nelson Screening Panel Memo, p. 11. Once again, OPC offers a 
legal standard that misinterprets the Rules of Professional Conduct. To the extent that 
standard was adopted by the Screening Panel, any recommendation of discipline is 
improper. 
The Screening Panel appears to conclude that only a lawyer may draft a document 
that formally memorializes an agreement reached in mediation. In fact, Rule 2.4(c) 
merely states that a lawyer-mediator may draft such a document. It does not state 
anywhere that only a lawyer may draft such a document. Rule of Professional Practice 
14-802(c)(7) and (9) specifically allow a non-lawyer to represent a party in a mediation 
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and serve as a mediator. Likewise, a non-lawyer may draft documents under the 
supervision of a lawyer. 
There is no evidence in the record that Long allowed or assisted Scheeler in 
holding himself out as a lawyer or engaging in the unauthorized practice of law. Long 
testified that on multiple occasions he specifically prohibited Scheeler from holding 
himself out as or acting like a lawyer. Nelson Transcript, pp.7-8, 10. The complainant in 
this case, Gordon Nelson, stated in his hand-written complaint: "Larry told my wife & 
David that Joe [Scheeler] did not have a license to practice law in any way." See Nelson 
Record 0001. In addition, there is no evidence in the record and no notation in any 
docket for any hearing that Scheeler entered an appearance on behalf of Merritt, as the 
Screening Panel claims in Tf 12 of its findings of fact. The record lacks, and the 
Screening Panel failed to cite, any evidence which would explain it's conclusion that 
Long violated Rule 5.5(a). In arriving at its recommendation, the Screening Panel 
appears to have mistaken the range of tasks which may be performed by a non-lawyer. 
E. Rule 8.4(a) 
Rule 8.4(a) provides that "a lawyer may not violate or attempt to violate the Rules 
of Professional Conduct, knowingly assist or induce another to do so, or do so through 
the acts of another." Because Long did not violate Rules 1.5(a), 3.1, 5.3(a), or 5.5(a), it is 
not necessary to invoke the disciplinary function of Rule 8.4(a). Accordingly, the charge 
that Long violated Rule 8.4(a) should be dismissed. 
IV. The Recommended Discipline for Violating Rules 7.1 and 7.5(d) Should Be 
Reduced: 
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In both the Shepard and Henroid matters, the Screening Panel recommended 
finding violations of Rules 7.1 and 7.5(d) on the grounds that Long misrepresented his 
status as a solo practitioner by referring to his firm as Long & Associates or L. Long 
Lawyers. Long concedes that at all times relevant, he was the only lawyer employed by 
the firm L. Long Lawyer, Inc. As Long testified in the hearing for the Henroid matter, 
the firm has employed associate lawyers in the past. Long has endeavored to represent 
himself as L. Long Lawyer, Inc. (as opposed to L. Long Lawyers, Inc.) when he has been 
the only attorney employed by the firm, but has admittedly been inconsistent in doing so. 
Henroid R. 000609. In the factual record for each of the cases at issue, documents can be 
found using both the singular and plural name of the firm. Compare Henroid R. 000085 
with 000526. 
The violation of Rules 7.1 and 7.5(d) has been the result of Long's negligence, not 
any purposeful attempt to deceive or mislead clients. Testimony at the hearing affirms 
that it was never suggested to clients that multiple attorneys work at the firm, or that 
anyone other than Long was their lawyer. As noted by Rule 14-607(b)(2) of the Rules of 
Professional Practice, absence of a dishonest or selfish motive should be considered in 
determining appropriate discipline for a violation of the Rules of Professional Conduct. 
The Findings of Fact and Conclusions of law for each matter do not indicate if 
appropriate consideration was taken. 
V. The Screening Panel's Disciplinary Recommendations Are Improper and 
Inconsistent: 
A. The Appropriate Sanction Under the Circumstances Is an Admonition. 
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In the Shepard matter, Long received an Admonition for violations of Rules 
1.5(a), 3.1, 7.1, 7.5(d), and 8.4(a). In the Nelson matter, Long received a Public 
Reprimand for violations of Rules 5.3(a), 5.5(a), and 8.4(a). In the Henroid matter, Long 
received a Public Reprimand for violations of Rules 1.5(a), 7.1, 7.5(d), and 8.4(a). 
According to Rule 14-605 of the Rules of Professional Practice: 
(c) Reprimand. Reprimand is generally appropriate when a lawyer: 
(c)(1) negligently engages in professional misconduct as defined in 
Rule 8.4(a), (d), (e), or (f) of the Rules of Professional Conduct 
and causes injury to a party, the public, or the legal system, or 
causes interference with a legal proceeding; or 
(c)(2) engages in any other misconduct that involves dishonesty, 
fraud, deceit, or misrepresentation and that adversely reflects on the 
lawyer's fitness to practice law. 
(d) Admonition. Admonition is generally appropriate when a lawyer: 
(d)(1) negligently engages in professional misconduct as defined in 
Rule 8.4(a), (d), (e), or (f) of the Rules of Professional Conduct 
and causes little or no injury to a party, the public, or the legal 
system or interference with a legal proceeding, but exposes a 
party, the public, or the legal system to potential injury or causes 
potential interference with a legal proceeding; 
Rules of Professional Practice 14-605 (emphasis added). In each of the matters at issue, 
there is no evidence in the record that any party was injured by any alleged violation or 
that any of the charged conduct involved dishonesty, fraud, deceit, or misrepresentation. 
Thus, under the guidelines in Rule of Professional Practice 14-605, only an admonition 
would be appropriate discipline absent aggravating circumstances. No aggravating 
circumstances are mentioned in any of the Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and 
Recommendation of Discipline in each of the matters at issue. 
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B. The Sanctions Imposed Are Inconsistent. 
An aggregate examination of the cases against Long reveals issues with 
consistency in the administration of attorney discipline. The Rules of Professional 
Practice specifically state that the Rules are designed to promote "consistency in the 
imposition of disciplinary sanctions for the same or similar offenses within and among 
jurisdictions." Rules of Professional Practice 14-602(d)(3) (emphasis added). Despite 
contemporaneous review of four10 factually similar cases, the Screening Panel arrived at 
inconsistent, and often illogical, resolution of each case. 
For example, three of the four cases against Long included allegations that Long 
violated Rule 1.5(a). Disposing of the three cases, the Screening Panel recommended— 
without any explanation or substantially different findings of fact or conclusions of law— 
a dismissal, an admonition, and a public reprimand. Case 07-0542, with the largest 
allegedly improper fee ($31,000), was dismissed on condition. The Henroid matter, with 
much smaller allegedly improper fees ($8,900 and $10,000), resulted in a public 
reprimand. Finally, the Shepard Matter ($6,600) resulted in an admonition. 
Similarly, in three of the four cases against Long, the Screening Panel considered 
allegations that Long was using an improper and misleading firm name, violating Rules 
7.1 and 7.5(d). In the Shepard matter, Long was admonished concerning these violations. 
In the Henroid matter, the Screening Panel recommended a public reprimand. In the 
Nelson matter, OPC recommended further investigation of the firm name issue in its 
10
 OPC File No. 07-0542 was dismissed on condition and is not challenged in this 
Petition. 
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Screening Panel Memo, but the Screening Panel apparently found insufficient evidence to 
warrant any discipline on this charge, and no violation was recommended. 
As argued in Part I of this brief, it is difficult for Long to defend against the 
Screening Panel's unexplained recommendations without any knowledge of the facts 
relied upon and reasoning employed. In an attempt to dismiss the inconsistency of the 
Screening Panel's recommendation in the Henroid matter, Mr. Maak sustains Long's 
complaint regarding inadequate findings and conclusions. Mr. Maak defends the 
Screening Panel's recommendation stating that to do otherwise, "one must assume that 
the Panel accepted Long's version of the work he performed on each of these matters, a 
fact that does not appear in the record and which is inconsistent with the Panel's 
findings." Henroid Exceptions Ruling, p.7 (emphasis added). As Mr. Maak 
acknowledges, the record and findings of the Screening Panel do not explain the 
apparently inconsistent result in the Henroid recommendation. One is left to guess at the 
factual basis and reasoning of the Screening Panel—a practice certainly not contemplated 
by Rule 14-510(b)(7) (requiring the Screening Panel to "state . . . the basis upon which 
the screening panel has concluded, by a preponderance of the evidence, that the 
respondent should be admonished or publicly reprimanded."). 
The Screening Panel neglected to adhere to the Court's instruction that a lawyer be 
given the opportunity to know the basis of the recommendation against him. See Rules of 
Professional Practice 14-510(c). The Panel likewise failed to promote consistent 
disciplinary sanctions for the same or similar offenses. See Rules of Professional Practice 
14-602(d)(3). 
49 
675 :425618vl 
CONCLUSION 
In each of the three matters below, the rules promulgated by this Court regarding 
attorney disciplinary proceedings were not followed. As a result, an attorney was 
incorrectly subject to disciplinary action and denied due process of law. Based on the 
foregoing, each Order of Discipline should be vacated. Long should be admonished or 
issued a letter of caution regarding his inadvertent violations of Rules 7.1 and 7.5(d), and 
the Committee should be ordered to print a retraction in the Utah Bar Journal regarding 
sanctions imposed against Long. 
DATED this _23_ day of April, 2010. 
VAN COTT BAGLEY CORNWALL & MCCARTHY 
^ 2 U 
John A. Snow 
AlexB.Leeman 
Attorneys for Petitioner Larry N. Long 
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Petitioner Larry N. Long, by and through counsel, submits this Addendum to Brief 
of Petitioner. The following documents are submitted herewith: 
1. Exhibit A: Determinative Law 
2. Exhibit B: OPC Matter No. 07-0497 (Shepard) Order of Discipline: 
Admonition 
3. Exhibit C: OPC Matter No. 07-0497 (Shepard) Findings of Fact, 
Conclusions of Law, and Recommendation of Discipline: Admonition 
4. Exhibit D: OPC Matter No. 07-0497 (Shepard) Ruling on Exception to 
Screening Panel Recommendation of Discipline. 
5. Exhibit E: OPC Matter No. 08-0049 (Nelson) Order of Discipline: 
Public Reprimand 
6. Exhibit F: OPC Matter 08-0049 (Nelson) Findings of Fact, 
Conclusions of Law, and Recommendation of Discipline: Public 
Reprimand 
7. Exhibit G: OPC Matter 08-0049 (Nelson) Ruling on Exception to 
Screening Panel Recommendation of Discipline. 
8. Exhibit H: OPC Matter No. 08-0080 (Henroid) Order of Discipline: 
Public Reprimand 
9. Exhibit I: OPC Matter No. 08-0080 (Henroid) Findings of Fact, 
Conclusions of Law, and Recommendation of Discipline: Public 
Reprimand 
10. Exhibit J: OPC Matter No. 08-0080 (Henroid) Ruling on Exception to 
Screening Panel Recommendation of Discipline. 
DATED this jZ_*_ day of April, 2010. 
VAN COTT BAGLEY CORNWALL & MCCARTHY 
&*? 
John A. Snow 
Alex B. Leeman 
Attorneys for Petitioner Larry N. Long 
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EXHIBIT A 
DETERMINATIVE LAW 
Rule of Professional Practice U-SlOibXl):1 
(b)(7) Recommendation of admonition or public reprimand. A screening 
panel recommendation that the respondent should be disciplined under 
subsection (b)(6)(C) or (b)(6)(D) shall be in writing and shall state the 
substance and nature of the informal complaint and defenses and the basis 
upon which the screening panel has concluded, by a preponderance of the 
evidence, that the respondent should be admonished or publicly 
1
 Prior to November 1, 2009, the proposition cited was numbered Rule of Professional 
Practice 14-510(b)(5), and read as follows: 
(b)(5) Screening panel determination. Upon review of all the facts 
developed by the informal complaint, answer, investigation and hearing, the 
screening panel, in behalf of the Committee, shall make one of the 
following determinations: 
(b)(5)(D) that the informal complaint be referred to the Committee chair 
with an accompanying screening panel recommendation that the respondent 
be admonished. Such screening panel recommendation shall be in writing 
and shall state the substance and nature of the informal complaint and 
defenses and the basis upon which the screening panel has concluded, by a 
preponderance of the evidence, that the respondent should be admonished. 
A copy of such screening panel recommendation shall be served upon the 
respondent prior to delivery of the recommendation to the Committee chair. 
The Committee chair shall enter an order admonishing the respondent if no 
exception has been filed within ten days of notice of the recommendation 
being provided to the respondent; or 
(b)(5)(E) that the informal complaint be referred to the Committee chair 
with an accompanying screening panel recommendation that the respondent 
receive a public reprimand. Such screening panel recommendation shall be 
in writing and shall state the substance and nature of the informal complaint 
and defenses and the basis upon which the screening panel has concluded, 
by a preponderance of the evidence, that the respondent should receive a 
public reprimand. A copy of such screening panel recommendation shall 
be served upon the respondent prior to delivery of the recommendation to 
the Committee chair. The Committee chair shall enter an order publically 
reprimanding the respondent if no exception has been filed within ten days 
of notice of the recommendation being provided to the respondent^] 
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reprimanded. A copy of such screening panel recommendation shall be 
delivered to the Committee chair and a copy served upon the respondent. 
Rule of Professional Practice 14-510(f)(5): 
(f)(5) Respondent shall have the burden of demonstrating that the 
Committee action was: 
(f)(5)(A) Based on a determination of fact that is not supported by 
substantial evidence when viewed in light of the whole record before 
the Court; 
(f)(5)(B) An abuse of discretion; 
(f)(5)(C) Arbitrary or capricious; or 
(f)(5)(D) Contrary to Articles 5 and 6 of Chapter 14 of the Rules of 
Professional Practice of the Supreme Court. 
Rule of Professional Practice 14-602(d): 
(d) Purpose of these rules. These rules are designed for use in imposing a 
sanction or sanctions following a determination that a member of the legal 
profession has violated a provision of the Rules of Professional Conduct. 
Descriptions in these rules of substantive disciplinary offenses are not 
intended to create grounds for determining culpability independent of the 
Rules of Professional Conduct. The rules constitute a system for 
determining sanctions, permitting flexibility and creativity in assigning 
sanctions in particular cases of lawyer misconduct. They are designed to 
promote: 
(d)(1) consideration of all factors relevant to imposing the 
appropriate level of sanction in an individual case; 
(d)(2) consideration of the appropriate weight of such factors in light 
of the stated goals of lawyer discipline; and 
(d)(3) consistency in the imposition of disciplinary sanctions for the 
same or similar offenses within and among jurisdictions. 
Rule of Professional Practice 14-605(d): 
(c) Reprimand. Reprimand is generally appropriate when a lawyer: 
(c)(1) negligently engages in professional misconduct as defined in 
Rule 8.4(a), (d), (e), or (f) of the Rules of Professional Conduct and 
causes injury to a party, the public, or the legal system, or causes 
interference with a legal proceeding; or 
675 :425618vl 
2 
(c)(2) engages in any other misconduct that involves dishonesty, 
fraud, deceit, or misrepresentation and that adversely reflects on the 
lawyer's fitness to practice law. 
(d) Admonition. Admonition is generally appropriate when a lawyer: 
(d)(1) negligently engages in professional misconduct as defined in 
Rule 8.4(a), (d), (e), or (f) of the Rules of Professional Conduct and 
causes little or no injury to a party, the public, or the legal system 
or interference with a legal proceeding, but exposes a party, the 
public, or the legal system to potential injury or causes potential 
interference with a legal proceeding^] 
Rule of Professional Conduct 1.5(a): 
(a) A lawyer shall not make an agreement for, charge or collect an 
unreasonable fee or an unreasonable amount for expenses. The factors to 
be considered in determining the reasonableness of a fee include the 
following: 
(a)(1) the time and labor required, the novelty and difficulty of the 
questions involved and the skill requisite to perform the legal service 
properly; 
(a)(2) the likelihood, if apparent to the client, that the acceptance of 
the particular employment will preclude other employment by the 
lawyer; 
(a)(3) the fee customarily charged in the locality for similar legal 
services; 
(a)(4) the amount involved and the results obtained; 
(a)(5) the time limitations imposed by the client or by the 
circumstances; 
(a)(6) the nature and length of the professional relationship with the 
client; 
(a)(7) the experience, reputation and ability of the lawyer or lawyers 
performing the services; and 
(a)(8) whether the fee is fixed or contingent. 
Rule of Professional Conduct 3.1: 
A lawyer shall not bring or defend a proceeding, or assert or controvert an 
issue therein, unless there is a basis in law and fact for doing so that is not 
frivolous, which includes a good-faith argument for an extension, 
modification or reversal of existing law. A lawyer for the defendant in a 
criminal proceeding, or the respondent in a proceeding that could result in 
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incarceration, may nevertheless so defend the proceeding as to require that 
every element of the case be established. 
Rule of Professional Conduct 5.3(a): 
With respect to a nonlawyer employed or retained by or associated with a 
lawyer: 
(a) a partner and a lawyer who individually or together with other 
lawyers possess comparable managerial authority in a law firm shall 
make reasonable efforts to ensure that the firm has in effect 
measures giving reasonable assurance that the person's conduct is 
compatible with the professional obligations of the lawyer[.] 
Rule of Professional Conduct 5.5(a): 
(a) A lawyer shall not practice law in a jurisdiction in violatiou of the 
regulation of the legal profession in that jurisdiction, or assist another in 
doing so. 
Rule of Professional Conduct 7.1: 
A lawyer shall not make a false or misleading communication about the 
lawyer or the lawyer's services. A communication is false or misleading if 
it contains a material misrepresentation of fact or law, or omits a fact 
necessary to make the statement considered as a whole not materially 
misleading. 
Rule of Professional Conduct 7.5(d): 
(d) Lawyers may state or imply that they practice in a partnership or other 
organization only when that is the fact. 
Rule of Professional Conduct 8.4(a): 
It is professional misconduct for a lawyer to: 
(a) violate or attempt to violate the Rules of Professional Conduct, 
knowingly assist or induce another to do so, or do so through the 
acts of another[.] 
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EXHIBIT B 
BEFORE THE ETHICS AND DISCIPLINE COMMITTEE 
OF THE UTAH SUPREME COURT 
In the Matter of the : ORDER OF DISCIPLINE: 
Discipline of: : ADMONITION 
Larry N. Long #01989 : 
Case No. 07-0497 
Respondent. : 
This matter came on for a hearing on February 19, 2009, before Screening 
Panel "C-2" of the Ethics and Discipline Committee of the Utah Supreme Court. The 
Chair of the Ethics and Discipline Committee, having reviewed the Findings of Fact, 
Conclusions of Law, and the Recommendation of Discipline of the Screening Panel, 
and being fully advised in the premises, hereby orders that Larry N. Long be and is 
hereby, admonished for violating Rules 1.5(a) (Fees), Rule 3.1 (Meritorious Claims and 
Contentions) Rule 7.1 (Communications concerning a Lawyer's Services), Rule 7.5(d) 
(Firm Names and Letterheads) and 8.4(a) (Misconduct). 
DATED this the 1 3 day of Kicx/ETK^frETt- 200? 
JmhupB. Dcrger, Chair 
Ethics and Discipline Committee 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that on the W day of ibi/ewV.-, 200^1 sent via United States 
first class mail, postage prepaid, a true and correct copy of the foregoing ORDER OF 
DISCIPLINE: ADMONITION to: 
Larry N. Long 
c/o John A. Snow 
36 S. State Street, Ste. 1900 
Salt Lake City, UT 84111 
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EXHIBIT C 
BEFORE THE ETHICS AND DISCIPLINE COMMITTEE 
OF THE UTAH SUPREME COURT 
In the Matter of the 
Discipline of: 
Larry N. Long, #01989 
Respondent. 
FINDINGS OF FACT, CONCLUSIONS 
OF LAW, AND RECOMMENDATION 
OF DISCIPLINE: ADMONITION 
Case No. 07-0497 
The matter of the complaint by Steven Shepard against Larry N. Long came on 
for hearing before Screening Pane! "C-2" of the Ethics and Discipline Committee of the 
Utah Supreme Court on February 19, 2009. Mr. Long appeared in person with Charles 
Gruber as Counsel; Mr. Shepard appeared by phone; and Barbara L. Townsend, 
Assistant Counsel, appeared on behalf of the Utah State Bar's Office of Professional 
Conduct ("OPC"). 
The Screening Panel recommends that Mr. Long be admonished for violation of 
Rules 1.5(a) (Fees), Rule 3.1 (Meritorious Claims and Contentions), Rule 7.1 
(Communications concerning a Lawyer's Services), Rule 7.5(d) (Firm Names and 
Letterheads) and 8.4(a) (Misconduct) of the Rules of Professional Conduct. The facts 
upon which the Screening Panel has concluded, by a preponderance of the evidence, 
that Mr. Long should be admonished are as follows: 
FINDINGS OF FACT 
1. Mr. Shepard met with Mr. Long for a free consultation. 
2. Mr. Long discussed his fees with Mr. Shepard and told him that his fee 
would be $6,600.00, if Mr. Shepard chose to hire him. 
3. Mr. Long appeared at one court hearing on an emergency basis. 
4. Mr. Long met with Mr. Shepard afterwards and discussed his fee. Mr. 
Shephard paid $100.00 for the appearance. 
5. Mr. Shepard signed a retainer agreement but then decided and told Mr. 
Long he did not want his representation. 
6. Mr. Shepard hired another attorney whose fee was less. 
7. Even though he had not been retained, Mr. Long appeared at a driver's 
license hearing. Mr. Long left when he saw that Mr. Shepard had another attorney. 
8. Mr. Long filed a collection lawsuit against Mr. Shepard for $7,775.34. 
9. Mr. Long charged an unreasonable fee for services rendered. 
10. Mr. Long caused a debt collection to be file for an amount more than what 
was owed. 
11. Mr. Long used L. Long Lawyers and Long and Associates as firm names 
on his letterhead when he is the only attorney in his office. 
12. L. Long Lawyers and Long and Associates represent to the public that 
there are other lawyers at Mr. Long's office. 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
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CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
(Rule 1.5(a) (Fees)) 
1. Rule 15(a). Fees. This rule states: "A lawyer shall not make an 
agreement for, charge or collect an unreasonable fee or an unreasonable amount for 
expenses. The factors to be considered in determining the reasonableness of a fee 
include the following 1) the lime and labor required, the novelty and difficulty of the 
questions involved and the skill requisite to perform the legal service properly; 2) the 
likelihood, if apparent to the client, that the acceptance of the particular employment will 
preclude other employment by the lawyer; 3) the fee customarily charged in the locality 
for similar legal services; 4) the amount involved and the results obtained; 5) the time 
limitations imposed by the client or by the circumstances; 6) the nature and length of 
the professional relationship with the client; 7) the experience, reputation and ability of 
the lawyer or lawyers performing the services; and 8) whether the fee is fixed or 
contingent." Mr. Long's fee of $6,600 was unreasonable given that Mr. Shepard paid 
him for one hearing and then decided not to hire him. By charging Mr. Shepard an 
unreasonable fee for services rendered, Mr. Long violated this rule. 
(Rule 3.1 (Meritorious Claims ancl Contentions)) 
2. Rule 3.1. Meritorious Claims and Contentions. This rule states: "A lawyer 
shall not bring or defend a proceeding, or assert or controvert an issue therein, unless 
there is a basis in law and fact for doing so that is not frivolous, which includes a good-
faith argument for an extension, modification or reversal of existing law. A lawyer for the 
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defendant in a criminal proceeding, or the respondent in a proceeding that could result 
in incarceration, may nevertheless so defend the proceeding as to require that every 
element of the case be established." Mr. Long sued Mr. Shepard for $7,775.34 when he 
knew that he had not earned this fee and by filing a debt collection case for an amount 
more than owed to him, Mr. Long violated this rule. 
(Rule 7.1 (Communications concerning a Lawyer's Services)) 
3. Rule 7.1. Communications concerning a Lawyer's Services. This rule 
states: "A lawyer shall not make a false or misleading communication about the lawyer 
or the lawyer's services. A communication is false or misleading if it contains a material 
misrepresentation of fact or law, or omits a fact necessary to make the statement 
considered as a whole not materially misleading". By using firm names of Long Lawyers 
and Long & Associates, Mr. Long misled the general public into believing that more 
than one lawyer worked at his office when in fact there was only one lawyer. By doing 
this , Mr. Long violated this rule. 
(Rule 7.5(d) (T mil Names and Letterheads)) 
4. Rule 7.5(d). Firm Names and Letterheads. This rule states: "Lawyers may 
state or imply that they practice in a partnership or other organization only when that is 
the fact. Mr. Long violated this rule by stating that he practiced in a firm of lawyers 
when he did not. 
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(Rule 8.4(a) (Misconduct)) 
5. Rule 8.4(a). This rule states: "It is professional misconduct for a lawyer to 
violate or attempt to violate the Rules of Professional Conduct, knowingly assist or 
induce another to do so, or do so through the acts of another." By violating the above 
described rules, Mr. Long violated this rule. 
MITIGATING FACTORS 
The Panel considered the following aggravating circumstances pursuant to Rule 
14-607 of the Standards for Imposing Lawyer Sanctions: 
1. Mr. Long did not actually collect the amount $7,775 from his client but 
resolved the dispute with this client without charging additional fees for the work he had 
performed. 
RECOMMENDATION OF DISCIPLINE 
Based upon the foregoing, the Screening Panel recommends that Larry N. Long 
be admonished for violation of Rules 1.5(a) (Fees), Rule 3.1 (Meritorious Claims and 
Contentions), Rule 7.1 (Communications concerning a Lawyer's Services), Rule 7.5(d) 
(Firm Names and Letterheads) and 8.4(a) (Misconduct) of the Rules of Professional 
Conduct. 
DATED this /*[ day of 'vyjHiL 200 J 
~^ 
latt Evans, Chair 
Screening Panel "C-2" 
s 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that on this 1 7 day of NoVCiAA rPC , 200 J I sent via 
United States first class mail, postage prepaid, a true and correct copy of the foregoing 
FINDINGS OF FACT, CONCLUSIONS OF LAW AND RECOMMENDATION FOR 
DISCIPLINE: ADMONITION to: 
Larry N. Long 
c/o John A. Snow 
36 S. State Street, Ste. 1900 
Salt Lake City, UT 84111 
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EXHIBIT D 
BEFORE THE ETHICS AND DISCIPLINE COMMITTEE 
OF THE UTAH SUPREME COURT 
In the Matter of the Complaint of: 
Steven Shepard, 
Complainant, 
Against 
Larry N. Long, 
Respondent. 
RULING ON EXCEPTION TO 
SCREENING PANEL 
RECOMMENDATION OF 
DISCIPLINE 
OPC File No. 07-0497 
This matter is before the Chair of the Ethics and Discipline Committee of the Utah 
Supreme Court pursuant to Rule 14-510(c) of the Utah Rules of Lawyer Discipline and Disability 
on Respondent's Exception to a Screening Panel recommendation that Respondent receive an 
admonition. 
STANDARD FOR DECIDING RESPONDENTS EXCEPTION 
As to Exceptions, Rule 14-510(c) of the Utah Rules of Lawyer Discipline and Disability 
states that "[t]he respondent shall have the burden of proof of showing that the recommendation 
is unreasonable, unsupported by substantial evidence, arbitrary, capricious and otherwise clearly 
erroneous." 
PRIOR PROCEEDINGS 
The Screening Panel Proceeding. The Screening Panel hearing occurred on February 
19, 2009 before Screening Panel C-2. The Screening Panel determined that Mr. Long violated 
Rule 1.5(a) through charging an unreasonable fee for services rendered and that he violated Rule 
3.1 by causing to be filed a debt collection action for amounts in excess than those that were 
owed to him. The Panel also found that Mr. Long violated Rules 7.1 and 7.5(d) by placing on his 
letterhead "L. Long Lawyer" or "Long & Associates/' which led the public to believe that more 
than one lawyer was affiliated with the firm when in fact there was only one lawyer — Mr. Long. 
The Panel recommended that the Respondent be admonished for these violations. 
The Exception. OPC supplied Mr. Long with proposed Findings of Fact, Conclusions of 
Law and a Recommendation of Discipline and a proposed Order of Discipline by letter dated 
June 15, 2009. Long, through Charles A. Gruber as his counsel, filed an Exception on July 1, 
2009. Thereafter, Mr. Gruber indicated his intention to call the Complainant at the Exception 
Hearing and to cross-examine him. Mr. Gruber withdrew as Mr. Long's counsel by Notice of 
Withdrawal dated September 22,2009. John A. Snow of the Van Cott firm entered his 
appearance as counsel for Mr. Long and (i) withdrew Mr. Gruber's request to cross-examine the 
Complainant, indicated that Mr. Long would not rely upon the documents Mr. Gruber filed with 
respect to the Exception (other than procedurally to perfect the Exception), and on October 22, 
2009 filed Exceptions to Screening Panel's Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and 
Recommendation. 
The Exception Hearing. The hearing of the Exception occurred on October 28, 2009 
between 12:30 p.m. and 2:30 p.m. Present at the hearing were the undersigned Chair, Barbara L. 
Townsend, Assistant Counsel to OPC, Respondent Larry N. Long, John A. Snow, and Alex B. 
Leeman. Complainant was not present at the hearing. Respondent offered argument concerning 
the Exception and OPC counsel also made statements during the Exception hearing. 
ANALYSIS OF EXCEPTION 
The Screening Panel decision sheet and the Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and 
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Recommendation of Discipline find violations of the following Rules of Professional Conduct 
based upon the following general behaviors: 
(1) Rule 1.5(a) based upon making an agreement for, charging, or collecting 
an unreasonable fee. 
(2) Rule 3.1 based upon the bringing of a debt collection action for amounts in 
excess of those that were due for services. 
(3) Rules 7.1 and 7.5(d) by communicating, issuing a communication, or 
using a firm name or letterhead implying that Mr. Long's firm employed more than one 
attorney when it did not. 
Each of the foregoing three items will be addressed separately. 
1. Unreasonable Fee. The Screening Panel found that Mr. Long charged an 
unreasonable fee. The Exception briefing and argument assert that there was not substantial 
evidence in the record to justify the finding that Long charged an unreasonable fee, that the only 
testimony concerning that issue was Long's testimony that the fees in question were reasonable, 
and that the Screening Panel's Findings of Fact failed adequately to articulate the facts upon 
which the Panel based its decision. The evidence before the Screening Panel included evidence 
that Long and Shepard agreed to Shepard's payment of $100.00 to compensate Long for an initial 
consultation and attending the first hearing. The flat fee agreement for legal services between 
Shepard and Long dated October 24, 2006 provided for a fee of $6,600.00 for Long's 
representation of Shepard up to and including the pretrial conference or preliminary hearing and 
subsequent sentencing upon entry of a plea. The record contains evidence that within two days 
after signing the fee agreement (and before Long had performed services beyond those for which 
he was compensated by the $100.00), Shepard advised Long that he had hired another attorney 
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and did not wish to proceed with Mr. Long as his counsel. Thereafter, a collection service, 
Express Recovery Services, Inc., initiated an action against Shepard on or about April 16, 2007 
(long after Shepard testified that he informed Long that he did not wish to utilize his services) to 
recover the full amount of $6,600.00 under the fee agreement plus interest and attorney's fees. 
Long's counsel at the Screening Pane! hearing indicated that Long rendered services valued at 
only $1,500.00. Shepard indicated that his total contact with Long regarding the case lasted 
approximately 45 minutes. Ultimately, Long caused the collection service's lawsuit against 
Shepard to be dismissed with Shepard paying nothing. 
The Screening Panel accepted Shepard's version of things, and Long has not earned his 
burden on this point to show that this recommendation was unreasonable, unsupported by 
substantial evidence, arbitrary, capricious, and otherwise clearly erroneous.1 
2. Pursuing Unmeritorious Claim. The Panel found that Long violated Rule 3.1 
by causing to be filed a debt collection action for amounts in excess of those to which he had an 
entitlement. Long argues that because the fee agreement prescribed that the fee agreed upon by 
the parties is considered earned once Long performed substantial legal services, and because it 
provided that no portion of the fee was refundable once substantial services had been performed, 
Long earned the $6,600.00 and causing a debt collection firm to pursue the entire matter was not, 
therefore, the pursuit of a frivolous claim. First, as indicated under the preceding section, there 
was evidence in the record that Long was fully compensated for the services he performed 
'Although the Findings of Fact do not enumerate the facts upon which the Panel's 
decision was based in evidentiary detail, they do make the requisite finding, albeit in somewhat 
conclusory form, that Long charged an unreasonable fee. Since the transaction with respect to 
which the fee was charged and the fee in question are self-evident (as there was only one 
engagement), the Panel's Findings were sufficient to support its conclusions. 
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through a payment of $100.00 and that he performed no services thereafter pursuant to the fee 
agreement. Concededly, fixed-price fee agreements are permissible under the Code of 
Professional Responsibility, but any fee that is charged must still fulfill the requirements of Rule 
1.5(a), which requires that the fee be reasonable in light of the factors set forth there. Here, upon 
evidence that the Panel believed or could have believed, Mr. Long did not render any services 
beyond those for which he was compensated through the initial $100.00 payment. There was, 
therefore, substantial evidence that Long's charging $6,600.00 (plus interest and attorney's fees) 
was charging or attempting to collect an unreasonable fee. Long next argues that Long, himself, 
did not file the collection action against Shepard, but rather assigned his rights under the fee 
agreement to Express Recovery Services, which itself filed suit. Based upon the evidence 
outlined above, the Panel concluded that Long referred for collection to Express Recovery 
Services an account receivable of $6,600.00 arising under a fee agreement with respect to which 
he was in fact owed nothing and had performed no services. The evidence does establish that 
Express Recovery Services, not Long, was the party to the collection action. Rule 3.1 provides 
that a lawyer "shall not bring or defend a proceeding, or assert or controvert an issue therein," 
without a basis in law or fact that is not frivolous. Mr. Long, as an attorney, knows or should 
know that when an account receivable is assigned for collection, the collection agency will file an 
action to recover upon it. Thus, when Long referred the fee agreement for collection, he knew or 
should have known that an action would be filed against Shepard based upon it. Long, as an 
attorney, also should have known that to recover in the collection agency's action, evidence 
would be required that compensable services were rendered under the fee agreement. Thus, 
Long knew or should have known that by virtue of his assigning the Shepard account for 
collection, the agency would "bring . . . a proceeding" and "assert... an issue" [i.e., that 
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compensable legal services had been rendered]. Through assigning the account for collection, 
Long in substance brought a proceeding and asserted therein that he had rendered compensable 
services under the fee agreement, and there exists substantial evidence that this was not so. 
Respondent Long has not carried his burden on this point to show that the Screening 
Panel's recommendation was unreasonable, unsupported by substantial evidence, arbitrary, 
capricious, and otherwise clearly erroneous. 
3. Rules 7.1 and 7.5(d) Concerning Letterhead. The Screening Panel found that 
Mr. Long violated these Rules by including on his letterhead the name "L. Long Lawyers" and 
"Long & Associates" when there was not more than one attorney in the firm. Mr. Long's 
Exception acknowledges committing a violation of these Rules. Although admitting that he 
violated the Rules, he indicates that from time to time the firm has employed other lawyers. 
Since Long concedes the violation, further discussion is unnecessary. At the Exception hearing, 
Long's attorney argued that Long was in effect being punished twice for the same violation in 
two cases ~ this case and in OPC No. 08-0080, with respect to which this violation was also 
found. A review of both files indicates that the communications that are the subject of the two 
cases are not the same — Long communicated with respect to the Shepard matter on inappropriate 
letterhead with various parties and with completely different parties in case number 08-0080. In 
addition, the time frames are different. With respect to this case, Mr. Long's communications 
occurred in approximately the time frame of October, 2006 [see, for example, R. 31, 32], 
whereas in OPC No. 08-0080, the use of the inappropriate letterhead was in the April, 2007 time 
frame [R. 131 in that file] as well as April 28, 2008 [R. 61 in that file]. It appears that Long's use 
of inappropriate letterhead was utilized with different people in different time frames and 
therefore constitute separate violations. Concededly, they are separate violations of the same 
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sort, but the issue in this case is whether the Screening Panel's decision should be sustained. 
Respondent has not carried his burden on this point to show that its recommendation was 
unreasonable, unsupported by substantial evidence, arbitrary, capricious, and otherwise clearly 
erroneous. 
RULING 
Respondent has failed to carry his burden to establish under Rule 14-510(c) that the 
Screening Panel's recommendation of an admonishment should be overturned. Respondent's 
Exception is therefore denied. 
DATED this (? day of November, 2009. 
ETHICS AND DISCIPLINE COMMITTEE 
OF THE UTAH SUPREME COURT 
c, Chair 
State Street, Suite 800 
Salt Lake City, UT 84111 
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EXHIBIT E 
BEFORE THE ETHICS AND DISCIPLINE COMMITTEE 
OF THE UTAH SUPREME COURT 
In the Matter of the 
Discipline of: 
Larry N. Long, #01989 
Respondent. 
ORDER OF DISCIPLINE: 
PUBLIC REPRIMAND 
Case No. 08-0049 
This matter came on for hearing on February 19, 2009 before Screening Panel 
"C-2" of the Ethics and Discipline Committee of the Utah Supreme Court. The Chair of 
the Ethics and Discipline Committee, having reviewed the Findings of Fact, Conclusions 
of Law, and the Recommendation of Discipline of the Screening Panel, and being fully 
advised in the premises, hereby orders that Larry N. Long be and is hereby, PUBLICLY 
REPRIMANDED for violating Rules 5.3(a) (Responsibilities Regarding Nonlawyer 
Assistants), Rule 5.5 (Unauthorized Practice of Law; Multijurisdictional Practice of Law) 
and Rule 8.4(a) (Misconduct) of the Rules of Professional Conduct. 
DATED this the / S d a y of /v*teWB&Z^ , 200?. 
Ethics and Discipline Committee 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that on the \!~J day of fJo iff inW 200^ I sent via United States 
first class mail, postage prepaid, a true and correct copy of the foregoing ORDER OF 
DISCIPLINE: PUBLIC REPRIMAND to: 
Larry N. Long 
c/o John A. Snow 
36 S. State Street, Ste. 1900 
Salt Lake City, UT 84111 
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EXHIBIT F 
BEFORE THE ETHICS AND DISCIPLINE COMMITTEE 
OF THE UTAH SUPREME COURT 
In the Matter of the 
Discipline of: 
Larry N. Long, #01989 
Respondent. 
FINDINGS OF FACT, CONCLUSIONS 
OF LAW, AND RECOMMENDATION 
OF DISCIPLINE: PUBLIC REPRIMAND 
Case No. 08-0049 
The matter of the complaint by Gordon Nelson against Larry N. Long came on 
for hearing before Screening Panel "C-2" of the Ethics and Discipline Committee of the 
Utah Supreme Court on February 19, 2009. Mr. Nelson did not appear, Mr. Long 
appeared in person with Charles Gruber as counsel; and Barbara L. Townsend, 
Assistant Counsel, appeared on behalf of the Utah State Bar's Office of Professional 
Conduct ("OPC"). The Screening Panel recommends that Mr. Long be publicly 
reprimanded for violating Rules 5.3(a) (Responsibilities Regarding Nonlawyer 
Assistants), Rule 5.5(a) (Unauthorized Practice of Law; Multijurisdictional Practice of 
Law) and Rule 8.4(a) (Misconduct) of the Rules of Professional Conduct. 
The facts upon which the Screening Panel has concluded the record establishes 
probable cause of misconduct and, by a preponderance of the evidence, that Mr. Long 
should be publicly reprimanded are as follows: 
FINDINGS OF FACT 
1. Mr. Long was hired by Mr. Nelson to represent David Merritt on a violation 
of a Protective Order. 
2. Mr. Nelson originally met with Joe Scheeler, a non lawyer working for Mr. 
Long, on April 18, 2007. Mr. Nelson paid a $750.00 retainer fee to Mr. Scheeler for Mr. 
Long to represent Mr. Merritt. 
3. After Mr. Long failed to appear at a court hearing for Mr. Merritt, Mr. 
Nelson called Mr. Long to inquire about his failure to appear and spoke to Mr. Scheeler. 
4. After Mr. Long failed to appear at the next hearing scheduled for Mr. 
Merritt, Mr. Nelson called to speak with Mr. Long and again only spoke with Mr. 
Scheeler. 
5. At one point, Mr. Scheeler planned to serve as a mediator for the parties 
in this dispute, while Mr. Long represented Mr. Merritt and while he was employed by 
Mr. Long. 
6. Mr. Scheeler prepared a mediation settlement document and sent it to 
opposing counsel for signature. 
7. Mr. Nelson was led to believe that Mr. Scheeler was an attorney. 
8. At Mr. Merritt's second court hearing, Mr. Scheeler appeared to "represent 
David" and tried to negotiate with the opposing party. 
9. Mr. Nelson only had contact with Mr. Scheeler and had the representation 
agreement explained by Mr. Scheeler. 
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10. Mr. Long failed to effect measures to make reasonably certain that Mr. 
Scheeler as his employee complied with the Rules of Professional Conduct. 
11. Mr. Long failed to adequately supervise Joe Scheeler's activities to insure 
Mr. Scheeler was not engaging in the Unauthorized Practice of Law. 
12. Mr. Long allowed Mr. Scheeler to appear in court, contact opposing party 
and conduct mediation proceedings at Mr. Long's office. 
13. Mr. Scheeler drafted a settlement agreement that Mr. Long ratified. 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
(Rule 5.3(a) (Responsibilities Regarding Nonlawyer Assistants)) 
1. Rule 5.3 (Responsibilities Regarding Nonlawyer Assistants) states that 
"With respect to a nonlawyer employed or retained by or associated with a lawyer": (a) "a 
partner and a lawyer who individually or together with other lawyers possess comparable 
managerial authority in a law firm shall make reasonable efforts to ensure that the firm 
has in effect measures giving reasonable assurance that the person's conduct is 
compatible with the professional obligations of the lawyer. By failing to effect measures to 
make reasonably certain that Mr. Long's employees complied with the Rules of 
Professional Conduct Mr. Long violated this rule. 
(Rule 5.5(a) (Unauthorized Practice of Law; Multijurisdictional Practice of Law)) 
2. Rule 5.5(a) (Unauthorized Practice of Law; Multijurisdictional Practice of 
Law) states that "A lawyer shall not practice law in a jurisdiction in violation of the 
regulation of the legal profession in that jurisdiction, or assist another in doing so." By 
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failing to adequately supervise Mr. Scheeler's activities to insure that Mr. Scheeler was 
not engaging in the Unauthorized Practice of Law and by allowing Mr. Scheeler to hold 
himself out as a lawyer, Mr. Long violated this rule. 
(Rule 8.4(a) (Misconduct)) 
3. Rule 8.4(a) (Misconduct) This rule states: "It is professional misconduct for 
a lawyer to violate or attempt to violate the Rules of Professional Conduct, knowingly 
assist or induce another to do so, or do so through the acts of another." By violating the 
rules described above Mr. Long violated this rule. 
RECOMMENDATION OF DISCIPLINE 
Based upon the foregoing, the Screening Panel recommends that Larry N. Long 
be publicly reprimanded for violation of Rules 5.3(a) (Responsibilities Regarding 
Nonlawyer Assistants), Rule 5.5(a) (Unauthorized Practice of Law; Multijurisdicitional 
Practice of Law), and Rule 8.4(a) (Misconcuct) of the Rules of Professional Conduct. 
Matt Evans, Chair 
Screening Panel "C-2" 
4 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that on this 1-7 day of \JpWm \>Qf , 200^, I sent via 
United States first class mail, postage prepaid, a true and correct copy of the foregoing 
FINDINGS OF FACT, CONCLUSIONS OF LAW AND RECOMMENDATION FOR 
DISCIPLINE: PUBLIC REPRIMAND to: 
Larry N. Long 
c/o John A. Snow 
36 S. State Street, Ste. 1900 
Salt Lake City, UT 84111 
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EXHIBIT G 
BEFORE THE ETHICS AND DISCIPLINE COMMITTEE 
OF THE UTAH SUPREME COURT 
In the Matter of the Complaint of: 
Gordon L. Nelson, 
Complainant, 
Against 
Larry N. Long, 
Respondent. 
RULING ON EXCEPTION TO 
SCREENING PANEL 
RECOMMENDATION OF 
DISCIPLINE 
OPC File No. 08-0049 
This matter is before the Chair of the Ethics and Discipline Committee of the Utah 
Supreme Court pursuant to Rule 14-510(c) of the Utah Rules of Lawyer Discipline and Disability 
on Respondent's Exception to a Screening Panel recommendation that Respondent receive a 
public reprimand. 
STANDARD FOR DECIDING RESPONDENT'S EXCEPTION 
As to Exceptions, Rule 14-510(c) of the Utah Rules of Lawyer Discipline and Disability 
states that "[t]he respondent shall have the burden of proof of showing that the recommendation 
is unreasonable, unsupported by substantial evidence, arbitraiy, capricious and otherwise clearly 
erroneous." 
PRIOR PROCEEDINGS 
The Screening Panel Proceeding. The Screening Panel hearing occurred on February 
19, 2009 before Screening Panel C-2. The Screening Panel determined that Mr. Long violated 
Rule 5.3 through failing to make reasonable efforts to assure that the conduct of his non-lawyer 
employee, Joe Scheeler ("Scheeler"), was compatible with Mr. Long's professional obligations 
and that Mr. Long violated Rule 5.5 by failing adequately to supervise Mr. Scheeler to ensure 
that Mr. Scheeler was not engaged in the unauthorized practice of law and to ensure that Mr. 
Scheeler was not holding himself out as a lawyer. The Panel recommended that Mr. Long be 
publicly reprimanded for these violations. 
The Exception. OPC supplied Mr. Long with proposed Findings of Fact, Conclusions of 
Law and a Recommendation of Discipline and a proposed Order of Discipline by letter dated July 
7, 2009. Long, through Charles A. Gruber as his counsel, filed an Exception on July 23, 2009. 
Thereafter, Mr. Gruber indicated his intention to call the Complainant at the Exception Hearing 
and to cross-examine him. Mr. Gruber withdrew as Mr. Long's counsel by Notice of Withdrawal 
dated September 22, 2009. John A. Snow of the Van Cott fmn entered his appearance as counsel 
for Mr. Long and (i) withdrew Mr. Gruber's request to cross-examine the Complainant, (ii) 
indicated that Mr. Long would not rely upon the documents Mr. Gruber filed with respect to the 
Exception (other than procedurally to perfect the Exception), and (iii) on October 22, 2009 filed 
Exceptions to Screening Panel's Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Recommendation. 
The Exception Hearing. The hearing of the Exception occurred on October 28, 2009 
between 12:30 p.m. and 2:30 p.m. Present at the hearing were the undersigned Chair, Barbara L. 
Townsend, Assistant Counsel to OPC, Respondent Larry N. Long, and his counsel, John A. 
Snow and Alex B. Leeman. Complainant was not present at the hearing. Respondent offered 
argument concerning the Exception and OPC counsel also made statements during the Exception 
hearing. 
ANALYSIS OF EXCEPTION 
The Screening Panel found that Long violated two specific ethical Rules: First, the Panel 
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found that Long violated Rule 5.3 by failing to make reasonable efforts to ensure that there were 
in effect measures reasonably assuring that the conduct of his assistant/office manager, Scheeler, 
would be compatible with Long's legal obligations. Second, the Panel found that Long violated 
Rule 5.5(a) by failing adequately to supervise Scheeler to ensure that he was not engaging in any 
unauthorized practice of law and by allowing Scheeler to hold himself out as a lawyer. Because 
the two are closely factually connected, they will be addressed together. 
There is evidence in the record that Long employed Scheeler as his office manager for 
some nine months. Included in Scheeler's responsibilities were interviewing clients and doing 
paralegal work. In addition, Scheeler made himself available through Long's office to do 
mediations. Long had a website which, under the heading "BAD ASS DEFENDERS" identified 
Long as attorney, Scheeler as the "legal mediator," and Jim Kirkman as the "client manager." As 
concerns the Complainant's interaction with Long's law office, the Complainant, Gordon Nelson 
("Nelson"), stated that he hired Scheeler to represent his friend David Merritt, who was 
incarcerated. Nelson testified that he contacted Long's office and spoke to Scheeler, who 
negotiated with him the retainer amount, which Nelson paid to Scheeler. Nelson understood that 
Scheeler was to appear at a hearing to attempt to get Merritt out of jail. No one from Long's 
office took action or appeared at the scheduled hearing. Nelson again spoke with Scheeler at 
Long's office, and Scheeler indicated that another $1,100.00 was required, which Nelson then 
paid. Scheeler advised Nelson that he would handle the matter himself "as a mediator" between 
Mr. Merritt and his accuser and would arrange to get Merritt out of jail. Scheeler appeared at a 
Court hearing with Merritt and, on that occasion, communicated with Merritt's accuser, Debbie 
Smith ("Smith"). In his dealings with Scheeler, Nelson believed that Scheeler was an attorney. 
Scheeler is not a member of the Utah State Bar. Long later himself appeared at a Court hearing 
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and advised Nelson that he would take the case for $3,000.00. Scheeler later conducted a 
"mediation" between Merritt and Smith and drafted a "Settlement Agreement" between Merritt 
and Smith. 
The dates of some of the occurrences are pertinent. Long's office received a letter from 
attorney Joseph Orifici dated May 2, 2007, which communicated that Orifici had been retained to 
represent Smith concerning issues with Long's client David Merritt. Long's receipt of that letter 
in that time frame suggests his knowledge of his own office's representation of Merritt veiy 
shortly after Scheeler collected the first two fee installments from Nelson. Based upon Nelson's 
payments to Long's office, it appears that Scheeler had his initial contacts with Nelson in the mid 
to late April, 2007 time frame [R. 225-226]. The Settlement Agreement was prepared by 
Scheeler and grew out of a mediation which occurred on June 1, 2007. After the mediation, 
Long wrote a letter on June 11, 2007 to Michael Nielsen, the prosecutor on the Merritt case, in 
which Long stated, "On June 1, 2007, David [Merritt] and the alleged victim VOLUNTARILY 
COMPLETED a mediation with Joseph Scheeler and they are currently working on a settlement 
and division of their property." [R. 141] Long's fee agreement [R. 31-32] is dated May 23, 
2007 — after Scheeler took the original two payments and after Orifici's letter to Long. This 
chronological sequence provides evidence that, first, Long knew that Orifici believed Long's 
office was representing Merritt before Long, himself, claims to have entered into a fee agreement 
and undertaken the representation - thereby suggesting that Long knew that there was some 
contact between his office (through Scheeler) and Merritt before he, Long, actually entered into a 
fee agreement relating to the Merritt representation. Second, it establishes that Long was aware 
of the "mediation" and efforts to agree on a settlement and division of property, which was 
apparently set forth in the Settlement Agreement that was prepared by Scheeler. Who did Long 
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think was doing all of this for Merritt? Negotiating a division of property for Merritt after the 
"mediation" constitutes the practice of law. It defies common sense that Long's office, through 
Scheeler, could conduct a mediation aimed at a division of property and a resolution of issues 
and negotiate about a division of property but that Long would be completely ignorant that 
Scheeler had conducted such negotiations or prepared a Settlement Agreement relating to that 
mediation. Long's letter suggests that he was aware that there was some agreement or 
negotiation of an agreement relating to the matter. If there were negotiations or an agreement, 
who did Long think was doing these things? He knew that he, the only lawyer in his office, was 
not doing these things. There is substantial evidence to indicate that Long was aware that 
Scheeler negotiated a property division and/or prepared the Settlement Agreement at least as of 
June, 2007, but Scheeler remained employed by Long's office until November, 2007. Long 
claims that his employment agreement with Scheeler precluded Scheeler's acting as an attorney. 
Indeed, that is the thrust of Long's defense. But here there is substantial evidence that Long 
knew of Scheeler's departure from such a restriction, yet Scheeler continued to be employed by 
Long until November, when Scheeler terminated the relationship. Long, while stating that he did 
not participate in the mediation, embraced and sought to take advantage of Scheeler's mediation 
resolution, when Long knew that the other party (Smith) was represented and Long, himself, 
knew that he had not appeared at the mediation to represent his client, negotiated a property 
division, or prepared any agreement growing out of the mediation. 
Long's Exception asserts that there is not substantial evidence to justify the Panel's 
Recommendation. As outlined above, there is substantial evidence to establish both that 
Scheeler was acting as a lawyer and that Long was aware that he was acting as a lawyer and, 
indeed, sought to take advantage of Scheeler's improper actions through communications with 
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the prosecutor in the case in which he was defending Merritt. In addition to what is outlined 
above, the very fact that Scheeler could have acted as he did with Nelson and Merritt suggests a 
lack of appropriate supervision. Scheeler's participation in the mediation and Settlement 
Agreement, of which there is substantial evidence suggesting that Long was at least at some time 
aware, and the fact that Long sought to capitalize upon these efforts in his representation of 
Merritt suggests an approval or ratification of behavior prohibited by the Code of Professional 
Responsibility. The misleading website is the website of Long & Associates ~ Long's law 
office. A reasonable inference that material appeared on Long's own website for an extended 
time is that he knew about it and did nothing timely to change it. 
The Exception next asserts that the Findings of Fact are insufficient to justify the 
Conclusions of Law. The Findings of Fact here enumerate instances on which Scheeler 
functioned as an attorney, that Long was led to believe Scheeler was functioning as an attorney, 
and matters bearing upon Mr. Long's failure to prevent these behaviors or to adequately 
supervise Scheeler's activities. The Findings of Fact, although not entirely in evidentiary detail, 
are sufficient to support the Conclusions of Law. 
The Exception also argues that there is no evidence that Long failed properly to supervise 
Scheeler and that the only evidence on that point is that it came from Long, who stated that he 
did make reasonable efforts to supervise Scheeler's conduct, including requiring Scheeler to sign 
an agreement in which Scheeler agreed not to practice law. Rule 5.3(a) requires that Long have 
in effect measures making "reasonably certain" that Scheeler's conduct complied with the Rules 
of Professional Conduct. Concededly, Long's written agreement with Scheeler is evidence that 
he made some effort in that regard. This, however, is not a de novo review. On the other side of 
the coin are the facts and chronology set forth above, which constitute substantial evidence that 
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Long was aware of Scheeler's inappropriate conduct and failed both (i) to take measures to make 
"reasonably certain" that Scheeler would not act in that way and (ii) after learning that Scheeler 
was in fact acting inappropriately, to make "reasonably certain" that it would not happen again. 
The Exception further argues that the mere fact that Scheeler conducted a mediation is 
not evidence that Scheeler acted inappropriately. Long correctly notes that non-lawyers may 
properly conduct mediations. Here, there is evidence that goes far beyond the mere conduct of a 
mediation. First, Long knew that Scheeler was associated with his office and had interacted in 
that capacity with a representative of the client in engaging Long's office as counsel. Scheeler 
then purported to act as a mediator between the Long firm's client and his opponent -- plainly an 
inappropriate act for a representative of Long's office given that Long represented one of the 
parties to the mediation. Someone (presumably Scheeler) negotiated a property division for 
Merritt with Smith or her counsel. Next, Scheeler prepared a Settlement Agreement, which he 
supplied to opposing counsel, which was conceded by Long at the Exception hearing to 
constitute the practice of law. Finally, Long became aware that the mediation had occurred 
without his participation and that the mediation had been handled by Scheeler at his office. He 
also knew at this time that the opposing party had been represented by counsel. Who was 
representing Long's client at the mediation? Why was Long not involved in the mediation as 
Merritt's counsel and why did Long not participate in the negotiations relating to the division of 
property? There is substantial evidence that, at the very least at this point in time, Long had 
knowledge that Scheeler was acting in violation of the Rules of Professional Conduct but he then 
communicated with the prosecutor that the mediation and settlement had occurred or were in 
process and were factors favoring Merritt's position, vis-a-vis the prosecution. 
Long's Exception finally argues that the Screening Panel's recommendation of a public 
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reprimand is inappropriate because of the lack of injury component set forth in Rule 14-605 of 
the Rules of Lawyer Discipline and Disability. There is evidence in the record to support the 
presence of such injury. Some, but by no means all, evidence of such injury is as follows: 
(i) After Nelson engaged Scheeler to represent Merritt, Long did not appear at 
a hearing and Merritt remained in jail. 
(ii) According to Nelson, he paid Long's office significant amounts for fees 
through Scheeler, but Long performed insubstantial services. 
(iii) Long's client, Merritt, participated in a mediation proceeding handled by 
Scheeler at which Merritt was unrepresented. 
(iv) Long's client, Merritt, was unrepresented in the negotiations relating to the 
property division and/or the Settlement Agreement. 
The injury to the legal system is self-evident when a person integrally connected with a law 
office representing one party conducts a mediation between that office's client and the party 
adverse to that client, but the law office's client is unrepresented at the mediation. Finally, there 
exists injury to the legal system when a person holds himself out as qualified to practice law 
without the requisite training and membership in the Bar. 
Long has not carried his burden of showing that the Screening Panel's recommendation is 
unreasonable, unsupported by substantial evidence, arbitrary, capricious, and otherwise clearly 
erroneous. 
RULING 
Respondent has failed to carry his burden to establish under Rule 14-510(c) that the 
Screening Panel's recommendation of a public reprimand should be overturned. Respondent's 
Exception is therefore denied. 
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DATED this day of November, 2009. 
ETHICS AND DISCIPLINE COMMITTEE 
OF THE UTAH SUPREME COURT 
laak, Chair 
State Street, Suite 800 
Lake City, UT 84111 
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EXHIBIT H 
BEFORE THE ETHICS AND DISCIPLINE COMMITTEE 
OF THE UTAH SUPREME COURT 
In the Matter of the : ORDER OF DISCIPLINE: 
Discipline of: : PUBLIC REPRIMAND 
Larry N. Long, #01989 : 
Case No. 08-0080 
Respondent. : 
This matter came on for hearing on February 19, 2009, before Screening Panel 
"C-2" of the Ethics and Discipline Committee of the Utah Supreme Court. The Chair of 
the Ethics and Discipline Committee, having reviewed the Findings of Fact, Conclusions 
of Law, and the Recommendation of Discipline of the Screening Panel, and being fully 
advised in the premises, hereby orders that Larry N. Long be and is hereby, PUBLICLY 
REPRIMANDED for violating Rules 1.5(a) (Fees), 7.1 (Communications Concerning a 
Lawyer's Services), 7.5(d) (Firm Names and Letterheads), and 8.4(a) (Misconduct) of 
the Rules of Professional Conduct. 
DATED this the £ 4 d a y of KUvtHMfcEJfc-, 2009. 
&pxvzfc. -Maak, Chair 
^ ^ h t e s and Discipline Committee 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that on the _) day of Ds'a/njyy, 2009 I sent via United States 
first class mail, postage prepaid, a true and correct copy of the foregoing ORDER OF 
DISCIPLINE: PUBLIC REPRIMAND to: 
Larry N. Long 
c/o John A. Snow 
VanCott Bagley Cornwall & McCarthy 
36 S. State St. 19th Floor 
Salt Lake City, UT 84111 
Respondent 
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EXHIBIT I 
BEFORE THE ETHICS AND DISCIPLINE COMMITTEE 
OF THE UTAH SUPREME COURT 
In the Matter of the 
Discipline of: 
Larry N. Long, #1989 
Respondent. 
: FINDINGS OF FACT, CONCLUSIONS 
OF LAW, AND RECOMMENDATION 
OF DISCIPLINE: PUBLIC REPRIMAND 
Case No. 08-0080 
The matter of the complaint by OPC against Larry N. Long came on for hearing 
before Screening Panel "C-2" of the Ethics and Discipline Committee of the Utah 
Supreme Court on February 19, 2009. Mr. Long appeared in person with counsel, 
Charles Gruber, and Barbara L. Townsend, Assistant Counsel, appeared on behalf of 
the Utah State Bar's Office of Professional Conduct ("OPC"). The Screening Panel 
recommends that Mr. Long be publicly reprimanded for violating Rules 1.5(a) (Fees), 
7.1 (Communications Concerning a Lawyer's Services), 7.5(d)'(Firm Names and 
Letterheads), and 8.4(a) (Misconduct) of the Rules of Professional Conduct. 
The facts upon which the Screening Panel has concluded the record establishes 
probable cause of misconduct and, by a preponderance of the evidence, that Mr. Long 
should be publicly reprimanded are as follows: 
FINDINGS OF FACT 
1. Mr. Long charged excessive fees for the work he completed in the 
Vantreese matter and the Perez Hernandez matter. 
2. At all times relevant to the conduct at issue, Mr. Long was the only lawyer 
in his office. 
3. Mr. Long presented himself to the public using the names L. Long 
Lawyers and Long & Associates. 
4. The use of these firm names led the public to conclude that there were 
other lawyers in Mr. Long's office. 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
(Rule 1.5(a) (Fees)) 
1 Rule 1.5(a) (Fees). This rule states: "A lawyer shall not make an agreement 
for, charge or collect an unreasonable fee or an unreasonable amount for expenses. The 
factors to be considered in determining the reasonableness of a fee include the following 
1) the time and labor required, the novelty and difficulty of the questions involved and the 
skill requisite to perform the legal service properly; 2) the likelihood, if apparent to the 
client, that the acceptance of the particular employment will preclude other employment 
by the lawyer; 3) the fee customarily charged in the locality for similar legal services; 4) 
the amount involved and the results obtained; 5) the time limitations imposed by the client 
or by the circumstances; 6) the nature and length of the professional relationship with the 
client; 7) the experience, reputation and ability of the lawyer or lawyers performing the 
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services; and 8) whether the fee is fixed or contingent" By charging excessive fees for 
work he performed in two cases, Mr. Long violated Rule 1.5(a) (Fees). 
(Rule 7.1 (Communications Concerning a Lawyer's Services)) 
2. Rule 7.1 (Communications Concerning a Lawyer's Services). Under this 
rule, "A lawyer shall not make a false or misleading communication about the lawyer or 
the lawyer's services. A communication is false or misleading if it contains a material 
misrepresentation of fact or law, or omits a fact necessary to make the statement 
considered as a whole not materially misleading." By using the names L. Long Lawyers 
and Long & Associates, Mr. Long misled the public and thereby violated Rule 7.1 
(Communications Concerning a Lawyer's Services). 
(Rule 7.5(d) (Firm Names and Letterheads)) 
3. Rule 7.1 (Communications Concerning a Lawyer's Services). Under this 
rule, "A lawyer shall not make a false or misleading communication about the lawyer or 
the lawyer's services. A communication is false or misleading if it contains a material 
misrepresentation of fact or law, or omits a fact necessary to make the statement 
considered as a whole not materially misleading." By using the names L. Long Lawyers 
and Long & Associates, Mr. Long's communications regarding his services were 
misleading and he violated Rule 7.5(d) (Firm Names and Letterheads). 
(Rule 8.4(a) (Misconduct)) 
4. Rule 8.4(a) (Misconduct). This rule states: I t is professional misconduct 
for a lawyer to violate or attempt to violate the Rules of Professional Conduct, knowingly 
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assist or induce another to do so, or do so through the acts of another." By violating the 
aforementioned Rules of Professional Conduct, Mr. Long violated Rule 8.4(a) 
(Misconduct). 
RECOMMENDATION OF DISCIPLINE 
Based upon the foregoing, the Screening Panel recommends that Larry N. Long 
be publicly reprimanded for violation of Rules 1.5(a) (Fees), 7.1 (Communications 
Concerning a Lawyer's Services), 7.5(d) (Firm Names and Letterheads), and 8.4(a) 
(Misconduct) of the Rules of Professional Conduct. 
DATED this 009. 
Matttvans, Chair 
Screening Panel "C-2" 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that on this J day of IhrP^b^r , 2009, I sent via 
United States first class mail, postage prepaid, a true and correct copy of the foregoing 
FINDINGS OF FACT, CONCLUSIONS OF LAW AND RECOMMENDATION FOR 
DISCIPLINE: PUBLIC REPRIMAND to: 
Larry N. Long 
c/o John A. Snow 
VanCott Bagley Cornwall & McCarthy 
36 S. State St. 19th Floor 
Salt Lake City, UT84111 
Attorney for Respondent 
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EXHIBIT J 
BEFORE THE ETHICS AND DISCIPLINE COMMITTEE 
OF THE UTAH SUPREME COURT 
In the Matter of the Complaint of: 
Office of Professional Conduct, 
Complainant, 
Against 
Larry N. Long, 
Respondent. 
RULING ON EXCEPTION TO 
SCREENING PANEL 
RECOMMENDATION OF 
DISCIPLINE 
OPC File No. 08-0080 
This matter is before the Chair of the Ethics and Discipline Committee of the Utah 
Supreme Court pursuant to Rule 14-510(c) of the Utah Rules of Lawyer Discipline and Disability 
on Respondent's Exception to a Screening Panel recommendation that Respondent receive a 
public reprimand. 
STANDARD FOR DECIDING RESPONDENT'S EXCEPTION 
As to Exceptions, Rule 14-510(c) of the Utah Rules of Lawyer Discipline and Disability 
states that "[t]he respondent shall have the burden of proof of showing that the recommendation 
is unreasonable, unsupported by substantial evidence, arbitrary, capricious and otherwise clearly 
erroneous." 
PRIOR PROCEEDINGS 
The Screening Panel Proceeding. The Screening Panel hearing occurred on February 
19, 2009 before Screening Panel C-2. The Screening Panel determined that Mr. Long violated 
Rule 1.5(a) through charging an unreasonable fee for services rendered and that he violated Rules 
7.1 and 7.5(d) by placing on his letterhead "L. Long Lawyeis" or "Long & Associates," which 
led the public to believe that more than one lawyer was affiliated with the firm when in fact there 
was only one lawyer — Mr. Long. The Panel recommended that the Respondent be publicly 
reprimanded for these violations. 
The Exception. OPC supplied Mr. Long with proposed Findings of Fact, Conclusions of 
Law and a Recommendation of Discipline and a proposed Order of Discipline by letter dated 
June 16, 2009. Long, through Charles A. Gruber as his counsel, filed an Exception on July 1, 
2009. Thereafter, Mr. Gruber indicated his intention to call the Complainant at the Exception 
Hearing and to cross-examine him. Mr. Gruber withdrew as Mr. Long's counsel by Notice of 
Withdrawal dated September 22, 2009. John A. Snow of the Van Cott firm entered his 
appearance as counsel for Mr. Long and (i) withdrew Mr. Gruber's request to cross-examine the 
Complainant, indicated that Mr. Long would not rely upon the documents Mr. Gruber filed with 
respect to the Exception (other than procedurally to perfect the Exception), and on October 22, 
2009 filed Exceptions to Screening Panel's Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and 
Recommendation. 
The Exception Hearing. The hearing of the Exception occurred on October 28, 2009 
between 12:30 p.m. and 2:30 p.m. Present at the hearing were the undersigned Chair, Barbara L. 
Townsend, Assistant Counsel to OPC, Respondent Larry N. Long, John A. Snow, and Alex B. 
Leeman. Complainant was .not present at the hearing. Respondent offered argument concerning 
the Exception and OPC counsel also made statements during the Exception hearing. 
ANALYSIS OF EXCEPTION 
The Screening Panel found Respondent Larry N. Long ("Long") to have violated the 
following Rules contained in the Code of Professional Responsibility: 
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1. Long violated Rule 1.5(a) by charging an unreasonable fee for work he 
performed on behalf of two clients: Vantreese and Hernandez. 
2. Long violated Rules 7.1 and 7.5(d) through using the names L. Long 
Lawyers and Long & Associates on letterhead and communication, which was misleading 
because at the applicable times there was only one lawyer associated with the firm — Mr. 
Long himself. 
3. Long violated Rule 8.4(a) by violating the Rules of Professional Conduct 
noted above. 
Based upon those violations, the Panel recommended that Long be publicly reprimanded. 
The claims that Long charged an unreasonable fee to Vantreese, charged an unreasonable 
fee to Hernandez, and used misleading letterhead will be addressed separately. 
A. Vantreese Fee Issue. 
Vantreese retained Long to represent her in defending against a charge of possession with 
intent to distribute, a second-degree felony, through a fee agreement dated April 5, 2007. The fee 
agreement was a flat fee agreement in the amount of $8,910.00. The agreement provided that 
this fee included representation "up to and including the pre-trial conference or Preliminary 
Hearing and subsequent Sentencing upon entrance of a plea." Long states that he actually 
received $8,900.00 on the Vantreese account. [R. 344] The Docket in the Vantreese matter 
reflects that Long performed the following services [as will be discussed in greater detail below, 
Long asserts that he performed services beyond those reflected in the Docket]: Mr. Long 
appeared for a pre-trial conference on 12-4-06 and requested a continuance; on 1-22-07 Long 
appeared at a pre-trial and requested a continuance; although it is unclear what Mr. Long did in 
this regard, on January 25, 2007 Ms. Vantreese was accepted into Drug Court; on 2-26-07 Long 
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appeared for a pre-trial conference with the case being continued; on 4-20-07 Long appeared for 
a pre-trial conference; on 5-3-07 Long appeared for a Drug Court hearing; on 5-24-07 Long 
appeared for a plea hearing at which Vantreese pleaded guilty. Thereafter, Vantreese appeared at 
Drug Court on a regular basis, but Long did not appear again in the case. After completing Drug 
Court successfully, the case against Vantreese was dismissed on 10-28-08. 
At the Screening Panel hearing, Long was asked about and testified concerning what he 
did on behalf of Vantreese. His testimony appears at pp. 38, et seq., in the transcript of the 
Screening Panel hearing. Long testified that he met with Vantreese to determine her objectives 
for his representation and that, thereafter, he performed the services outlined in the Docket as set 
forth above. Long testified about his consideration of various legal strategies on behalf of 
Vantreese, his review of the preliminary hearing tape, and his negotiations with the prosecutor, 
George Voduc. Long testified that it was atypical for a defense attorney to attend Drug Court 
cases, which accounted for his not attending Drug Court with Vantreese. Long testified that he 
achieved all of the representation goals outlined for him, achieved a good result for his client, 
and that his client never complained about the fees charged. Long submitted the Affidavit of 
Gregory Skordas [T. 60], which Mr. Skordas outlines his qualifications, and that the flat fees 
charged by Mr. Long in this case as well as the Hernandez case discussed below "are not 
unreasonable for the representation undertaken and are consistent with fees being charged by 
other attorneys in the Salt Lake City area for cases in which similar charges have been filed." 
In addition to the transcript of the hearing, Long submitted extensive materials, prepared 
by him after the subject Informal Complaint was filed, outlining a reconstruction of his activities 
in the case. Mr. Long concludes that he spent 45 hours of work which, at a rate of $300.00 per 
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hour, is a reasonable fee.1 
In his Exception, Long first argues that its recommendation was not based upon 
substantial evidence. The Screening Panel had before it both Long's description at the hearing of 
the services he performed and the Docket's presentation of the court proceedings in which Mr. 
Long participated. That evidence collectively establishes that Long appeared at several pre-trial 
conferences that were seemingly uncomplicated ~ many merely involved a request for 
continuance that was granted. Thereafter, Vantreese was accepted into Drug Court and Long 
appeared one more time — again, for an insubstantial hearing. Long, in addition, offered 
testimony of additional services, including consultations with his client, settlement negotiations 
with the prosecution, and internal discussions of a strategy. Considering the court Docket's 
enumeration of Long's involvement and Long's testimony at the hearing of what he did for 
Vantreese, the Screening Panel could have concluded that Long spent an insubstantial amount of 
time in the Vantreese representation. The court Docket combined with Long's testimony before 
the Panel about what he did for Vantreese provide substantial evidence that he did not perform 
services commensurate with the $8,900.00 fee that he charged and collected. The Screening 
Panel was not obligated to believe Long's written retrospective accounting, supported with no 
contemporaneous records that were introduced, of services he performed. The Screening Panel 
could have chosen not to believe that retrospective accounting because it was seemingly 
inconsistent with the Docket and Long's testimony at the hearing. In addition, as to most of the 
additional tasks outlined in the retrospective accounting, there was no evidence introduced to the 
effect that the tasks were necessary, that the products of the tasks were utilized, or that such 
'Dividing $8,900.00 by 45 hours results in approximately a $200.00 hourly rate. 
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products benefitted Vantreese in any way. 
Fixed fee agreements are, concededly, permissible under the Code of Professional 
Responsibility. That notwithstanding, any fixed fee that is charged must be reasonable in light of 
the services actually performed giving consideration to the factors set forth in Rule 1.5. Thus, 
the Affidavit of Gregory Skordas, while providing evidence that a fixed fee for the amount 
charged by Mr. Long is reasonable does not address the second prong of the analysis — that is, 
whether the fixed fee was reasonable in light of the services actually performed. 
This is not a de novo review. The applicable standard requires that the Screening Panel's 
decision be affirmed if there is any substantial evidence to support it. For the reasons set forth 
above, the Chair concludes that there is substantial evidence from which the Screening Panel 
could conclude as it did that Long charged an unreasonable fee with respect to the Vantreese 
representation. 
Long next argues in-his Exception that the Screening Panel's Findings of Fact are 
insufficient to justify its conclusions of law. Long points out that Rule 14-510(b)(5)(E) requires 
that its recommendation "state the substance and nature of the informal complaint and defenses 
and the basis upon which the Screening Panel has concluded . . . that the Respondent should 
receive a public reprimand." Here, the Findings of Fact, although brief and not in evidentiary 
detail, do state that Long charged excessive fees for his work on the Vantreese matter. Again, 
although the Findings are not given in evidentiary detail, the Rule that Long violated, how he 
violated that Rule (by charging unreasonable fees), and the representation involved (the 
Vantreese representation) are all identified. What the Findings do not do is articulate the specific 
evidence that the Screening Panel believed and disbelieved and the analytical process by which 
the Panel came to the conclusion that Long overcharged Vantreese. The Chair does not believe 
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that Findings at that level of detail are required by Rule 14-510(b)(5)(E).2 
Long also suggests that the procedure followed by the OPC and the Screening Panel did 
not give him reasonable notice of the charges against him. The Notice of Informal Complaint in 
this matter [R. 38, et seq.] sets forth in substantial detail the potential violations and the basis for 
those potential violations of the Code of Professional Responsibility. Long had ample notice of 
the charges against him and the basis for those charges to enable him to prepare a defense. 
Finally, Long's Exception argues that the Screening Panel made inconsistent findings 
with respect to the Vantreese, Hernandez, and Kenney matters (all three of such matters being the 
subject of a single Informal Complaint). Long argues that because the hourly rate on the 
Vantreese and Hernandez matters (assuming Long's claim of the hours he spent on each matter 
are accepted) were each $200.00 per hour and were found to be unreasonable, yet with respect to 
the Kenney matter, where Long charged an effective rate of over $600.00 per hour, the Panel 
found no unreasonable fee was charged, the Panel's results are inconsistent. To reach that 
conclusion, one must assume that the Panel accepted Long's version of the work he performed 
on each of these matters, a fact that does not appear in the record and which is inconsistent with 
the Panel's findings. 
B. Hernandez Fee Issue. 
Long was engaged to represent Hernandez pursuant to a fixed fee agreement dated March 
26, 2007. The agreement provided for a fixed fee of $10,000.00 for representation through the 
2The Screening Panel procedure contemplated by the Rules of Lawyer Discipline and 
Disability, while containing provisions assuring due process and a reasonable record in the event 
of an Exception, do not envision the level of detail and precision embraced with respect to civil 
and criminal proceedings. Indeed, given the very nature of Screening Panel proceedings and the 
volunteers who conduct them, such detail and precision would not be practical or feasible. 
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pre-trial conference or preliminary hearing and subsequent sentencing upon entry of a plea. Mr. 
Long states that he actually received $7,750.00 of that amount. 
The court Docket in the Hernandez matter indicates the following activities of Mr. Long: 
On March 23, 2007, Mr. Long made an initial appearance; on April 12, 2007, Mr. Long appeared 
at a roll call that was continued; on April 23, 2007, Mr. Long filed an appearance of counsel, a 
request for discovery, and a motion to preserve evidence; on May 31, 2007, Long appeared and 
advised the court that Hernandez had been accepted into Drug Court; on 6-28-07 Long appeared 
for a change of plea hearing that was continued; on July 5, 2007, Long appeared for a change of 
plea hearing. Hernandez appeared thereafter over an extended period for Drug Court. Mr. Long 
did not appear at any of these hearings. 
Long's testimony at the hearing before the Screening Panel reflects that Long performed 
the following services in the Hernandez matter [Transcript pp. 60, et seq.]: Mr. Long testified 
that he prepared a request for discovery and a motion to preserve evidence (both appear to be 
form documents), that he participated in a plea in abeyance as a result of Hernandez being 
accepted by the Drug Court, and that he did not appear for Drug Court hearings with Hernandez 
because that is not typically done by defense counsel. Mr. Long testified that his client was 
satisfied with his representation and did not ask for any refund. Mr. Long submitted an 
accounting as to his activities on the Hernandez case [R. 64, et seq.]. The accounting was 
prepared after the Informal Complaint and is not based on contemporaneously prepared 
documents that were placed in the record. Mr. Long asserts that he believes he spent 50-60 hours 
of time representing Hernandez which, when divided into the actual fee charged of $7,750.00, 
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yields an estimated hourly fee of $300.00 per hour.3 
Mr. Long's Exception to the excessive fee violation with respect to the Hernandez matter 
tracks his Exception with respect to the Vantreese matter outlined above. With respect to his 
assertion that there is no substantial evidence to justify the Screening Panel's recommendation, 
the analysis is much the same as with respect to the Vantreese matter. The Docket and testimony 
offered by Mr. Long at the Screening Panel hearing both indicate that Mr. Long did very limited 
work for the fee he charged. The Screening Panel was not required to accept the accounting 
submission prepared by Mr. Long after the Informal Complaint against him was submitted. 
Based upon the content of the Docket and the testimony offered, there is substantial evidence to 
support the Screening Panel's recommendations. Also, as was the case with Vantreese, with 
respect to most of the additional tasks outlined in Long's post-Initial Complaint accounting, there 
was no evidence introduced that the tasks were necessary, that the products of the tasks were 
utilized, or that such products benefitted Hernandez in any way. 
This is not a de novo review. The applicable standard requires that the Screening Panel's 
decision be affirmed if there is any substantial evidence to support it. For the reasons set forth 
above, the Chair concludes that there is substantial evidence from which the Screening Panel 
could conclude as it did that Long charged an unreasonable fee with respect to the Hernandez 
representation. 
The Exception further asserts that the Screening Panel failed to articulate sufficient 
Findings of Fact which would justify its Conclusions of Law. In this regard, the analysis of this 
aspect of the Exception mirrors that set forth above with respect to the Vantreese matter. The 
3Dividing $7/750.00 by 55 hours (he claims 50-60) yields approximately $140.00 per 
hour. 
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reasons there stated, the Findings of Fact, while not in evidentiary detail, are sufficient to justify 
the Conclusions of Law. Further, like the Vantreese matter, the Notice of Informal Complaint 
gave Mr. Long adequate information about the charges against him to enable him to prepare a 
defense. The Exception's assertion of inconsistency is also treated above in connection with the 
Vantreese matter. 
C. Violations of Rules 7.1 and 7.5(d). 
The Screening Panel found that Long presented himself to the public using the names 
L. Long Lawyers and Long & Associates and that the use of these firm names led the public to 
conclude that there were other lawyers in Mr. Long's office besides Mr. Long himself. Long 
conceded at the Screening Panel hearing that, although from time to time Long employed lawyers 
besides himself, throughout the time period that his letterhead suggested that there were more 
than one lawyer in his office, there were times that Mr. Long was the only lawyer. See 
Transcript, pp. 15, et seq. The Exception concedes a violation of these Rules, but suggests that 
because the violation was innocent and because of the absence of a dishonest or selfish motive, 
the recommended discipline should be reduced (presumably from a public reprimand to an 
admonishment). As described above in Sections A and B, apart from the violation of Rules 7.1 
and 7.5(d), there is substantial evidence that Long violated Rule 1.5. If one accepts that there 
was substantial evidence that Long charged an unreasonable fee to his clients, existence of 
damage to the client is self-evident. That being so, the elements of a public reprimand set forth 
in Rule 14-605(c) exist and public reprimand is an appropriate sanction even in the absence of a 
violation of Rules 7.1 and 7.5(d). 
D. Long's Claim of Inconsistency Between Separate OPC Cases. 
Long's Exception argues that the conclusions arrived at in various identified cases against 
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Long4 are inconsistent. Concededly, consistency is a goal in the imposition of disciplinary 
sanctions "for the same or similar offenses." Rule 14-602(d)(3). For the following reasons, this 
argument is not a basis for rejecting the Screening Panel's recommendation here. First, each of 
the cases identified by Long involves different parties, different facts, and different 
circumstances. Long has not shown that, based upon the Panel's findings in each separate case, 
the conclusions of the Panel are not consistent. Second, with respect to this specific matter and 
this Exception, Long has the burden of proof showing that the recommendation was 
unreasonable, unsupported by substantial evidence, arbitrary, capricious, and otherwise clearly 
erroneous. That Long may -have been disciplined less severely in another case that he identifies 
is not a basis for granting the Exception here — the issue rather is whether in this matter, the 
recommendation is inappropriate under the standard set forth in Rule 14-510(c). For the reasons 
outlined above, Long failed to cany his burden in that regard. 
RULING 
Respondent has failed to cany his burden to establish under Rule 14-510(c) that the 
Screening Panel's recommendation of a public reprimand should be overturned. Respondent's 
Exception is therefore denied. 
4These cases include this case and cases numbered OPC File Nos. 08-0049 and 07-0497. 
-11-
DATED this If day of November, 2009. 
ETHICS AND DISCIPLINE COMMITTEE 
OF THE UTAH SUPREME COURT 
Chair 
State Street, Suite 800 
fait Lake City, UT 84111 
-12-
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that on the 19th day of November, 2009, I mailed via United 
States first-class mail, postage pre-paid, a true and correct copy of the foregoing Ruling, 
dated November 17, 2009, signed by Bruce Maak, Chair of the Ethics and Discipline 
Committee to: 
John A. Snow 
Vancott Bagley Cornwall & McCarthy 
36 South State St. 19th Floor 
Salt Lake City, UT 84111 
IN THE UTAH SUPREME COURT 
LARRY N.LONG, 
Petitioner, 
vs. 
ETHICS AND DISCIPLINE 
COMMITTEE OF THE UTAH SUPREME 
COURT, 
Respondent. 
Appellate Case No. 20091018-SC 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
On Petition for Review or Petition for Extraordinary Relief 
from a final Order of Discipline: Admonition, Order of Discipline: Public Reprimand, 
and Order of Discipline: Public Reprimand 
by Respondent Ethics and Discipline Committee of the Utah Supreme Court, 
OPC File Nos. 07-0497, 08-0049, and 08-0080. 
OFFICE OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT, 
UTAH STATE BAR 
Billy L. Walker (#3358) 
Adam C. Bevis (#9889) 
645 South 200 East 
Salt Lake City, UT 84111 
Tel: 801-531-9110 
Email: adam.bevis@utahbar.org 
Attorneys for the Ethics and Discipline 
Committee of the Utah State Bar 
VAN COTT BAGLEY CORNWALL & MCCARTHY 
John A. Snow (#3025) 
Alex B.Leeman (#12578) 
36 South State Street, Suite 1900 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Tel: 801-532-3333 
Fax: 801-534-0058 
Email: jsnow@vancott.com, 
aleeman@vancott.com 
Attorneys for Petitioner Larry N. Long 
675 :425618vl 
1 
I hereby certify that on the £S day of April, 2010,1 caused two (2) copies of the 
BRIEF OF PETITIONER and accompanying ADDENDUM to be delivered to each of 
the following: 
Bruce A. Maak 
Parr Brown Gee & Loveless 
185 South State Street, Suite 1300 
Salt Lake City, UT 84111-1537 
Billy Walker 
Adam Bevis 
Utah State Bar 
645 South 200 East 
Salt Lake City, UT 84111 
D 
ISI 
• 
• 
• 
• 
IEI 
• 
• 
• 
U.S. Mail, postage prepaid 
Hand Delivery 
Fax 
Overnight courier 
Electronically 
U.S. Mail, postage prepaid 
Hand Delivery 
Fax 
Overnight courier 
Electronically 
DATED this 2 > day of April, 2010. 
VAN COTT BAGLEY CORNWALL & MCCARTHY 
John A. Snow 
Alex B. Leeman 
Attorneys for Petitioner Larry N. Long 
fi7«^ -49^fi1«\/1 
2 
